To ensure clearness, we must
dwell upon this point. As the peculiar phænomena of heat and
cold—which are themselves by nature opposed to each other (let us
take fire and ice as examples of each), each being that which the other
is not—are at variance with each other, cooling being the
peculiarity of ice, heating of fire; so if in accordance with the
antithesis expressed by the names, the nature revealed by those names
is parted asunder, it is not to be admitted that the faculties
attending these natural “subcontraries ὑπεναντίων” are like each other, any more than
cooling can belong to fire, or burning to ice. If, then, goodness is
inseparable from the idea of the non-generated nature, and that nature
is parted on the ground of being, as they declare, from the generated
nature, the properties of the former will be parted as well from those
of the latter: so that if the good is found in the first, the quality
set against the good is to be perceived in the last. Thus, thanks to
our clever systematizers, Manes lives again with his parallel line of
evil in array over against the good, and his theory of opposite powers
residing in opposite natures.