224
any who own, that God preserves things in being, and yet hold that they would continue in
being without any further help from him, after they once have existence; I think, it is hard
to know what they mean. To what purpose can it be, to talk of God preserving things in being,
when there is no need of his preserving them? Or to talk of their being dependent on God
for continued existence, when they would of themselves continue to exist, without his help;
nay, though he should wholly withdraw his sustaining power and influence?
It will follow from what has been observed, that God’s upholding of created substance,
or causing of its existence in each successive moment, is altogether equivalent to an imme-
diate production out of nothing, at each moment. Because its existence at this moment is
not merely in part from God, but wholly from him; and not in any part, or degree, from its
antecedent existence. For, to suppose that its antecedent existence concurs with God in effi-
ciency, to produce some part of the effect, is attended with all the very same absurdities,
which have been shown to attend the supposition of its producing it wholly. Therefore the
antecedent existence is nothing, as to any proper influence or assistance in the affair: and
consequently God produces the effect as much from nothing, as if there had been nothing
before. So that this effect differs not at all from the first creation, but only circumstantially;
as, in the first creation there had been no such act and effect of God’s power before: whereas,
his giving existence afterwards, follows preceding acts and effects of the same kind, in an
established order.
Now, in the next place, let us see how the consequence of these things is to my present
purpose. If the existence of created substance, in each successive moment, be wholly the effect
of God’s immediate power, in that moment, without any dependence on prior existence, as
much as the first creation out of nothing, then what exists at this moment, by this power, is
a new effect; and simply and absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence,
though it be like it, and follows it according to a certain established method. 153 And there
153 When I suppose, that an effect which is produced every moment by a new action or exertion of power,
must be a new effect in each moment, and not absolutely and numerically the same with that which existed in
preceding moments, what I intend, may be illustrated by this example. The lucid colour or brightness of the
moon, as we look steadfastly upon it, seems to be a permanent thing, as though it were perfectly the same
brightness continued. But indeed it is an effect produced every moment. It ceases, and is renewed, in each suc-
cessive point of time; and so becomes altogether a new effect at each instant; and no one thing that belongs to
it, is numerically the same that existed in the preceding moment. The rays of the sun, impressed on that body,
and reflected from it, which cause the effect, are none of them the same: the impression, made in each moment
on our sensory, is by the stroke of new rays: and the sensation excited by the stroke, is a new effect, an effect of
a new impulse. Therefore the brightness or lucid whiteness of this body is no more numerically the same thing
with that which existed in the preceding moment, than the sound of the wind that blows now, is individually
the same with the sound of the wind that blew just before; which, though it be like it, is not the same, any more
than the agitated air, that makes the sound, is the same; or than the water, flowing in a river, that now passes
1159
CHAPTER III. The Imputation of Adam's Sin stated.