series of sounds they are connected with, may be very discordant, and disagreeable. That
only, therefore, is what I mean by true virtue, which, belonging to the heart of an intelligent
being, is beautiful by a general beauty, or beautiful in a comprehensive view, as it is in itself,
and as related to every thing with which it stands connected. And therefore, when we are
inquiring concerning the nature of true virtue—wherein this true and general beauty of the
heart does most essentially consist—this is my answer to the inquiry:—
True virtue most essentially consists in benevolence to being in general. Or perhaps, to
speak more accurately, it is that consent, propensity, and union of heart to being in general,
which is immediately exercised in a general good will.
The things before observed respecting the nature of true virtue, naturally lead us to such
a notion of it. If it has its seat in the heart, and is the general goodness and beauty of the
disposition and its exercise, in the most comprehensive view, considered with regard to its
universal tendency, and as related to every thing with which it stands connected; what can
it consist in, but a consent and good will to being in general? Beauty does not consist in
discord and dissent, but in consent and agreement. And if every intelligent being is some
way related to being in general, and is a part of the universal system of existence; and so
stands in connexion with the whole; what can its general and true beauty be, but its union
and consent with the great whole?
If any such thing can be supposed as a union of heart to some particular being, or
number of beings, disposing it to benevolence to a private circle or system of beings, which
are but a small part of the whole; not implying a tendency to an union with the great system,
and not at all inconsistent with enmity towards being in general; this I suppose not to be of
the nature of true virtue; although it may in some respects be good, and may appear beautiful
in a confined and contracted view of things.—But of this more afterwards.
It is abundantly plain by the Holy Scriptures, and generally allowed, not only by chris-
tian divines, but by the more considerable Deists, that virtue most essentially consists in
love. And I suppose, it is owned by the most considerable writers, to consist in general love
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of benevolence, or kind affection: though it seems to me the meaning of some in this affair
is not sufficiently explained; which perhaps occasions some error or confusion in discourses
on this subject.
When I say, true virtue consists in love to being in general, I shall not be likely to be
understood, that no one act of the mind or exercise of love is of the nature of true virtue,
but what has being in general, or the great system of universal existence, for its direct and
immediate object: so that no exercise of love, or kind affection, to any one particular being,
that is but a small part of this whole, has any thing of the nature of true virtue. But, that the
nature of true virtue consists in a dispositionto benevolence towards being in general; though
from such a disposition may arise exercises of love to particular beings, as objects are
presented, and occasions arise. No wonder, that he who is of a generally benevolent dispos-
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CHAPTER I. Concerning the essence of true virtue.