This doctrine, as is well known is predicating the same
properties of the two natures in Christ, not in abstracto
(Godhead and manhood), but in concreto (God and man).
Christ himself had declared in St. John iii., 16:
“God…gave his only begotten Son” (namely, to death),
and similarly St. Peter declared (Acts iii., 15): “ye…killed the
Prince of Life,” when in fact the being given up and being killed
is a property (ἰδίωμα = predicate) of
man, not of God (the only begotten, the Prince of
Life). In the same way Clement of Rome, for example, spoke of
“the sufferings of God” (παθήματα
Θεοῦ) (1 Ad Cor. 2), Ignatius of
Antioch (Ad Ephes., c. 1, and Ad Rom., 6) of an
αἷμα and
πάθος
Θεοῦ, Tatian of a Θεὸς
πεπονθὼς (Ad
Græcos, c. 13); Barnabas teaches (c. 7) that “the Son of
God could not suffer except on our behalf…and on our behalf he
has brought the vessel of his Spirit as a sacrifice.”
Similarly Irenæus (iii., 16, 6) says, “The Only-begotten
impassible Word (unigenitus impassibilis) has become
passible” (passibilis); and Athanasius, ἐσταυρώμενον
εἶναι Θεὸν
(Ep. ad Epictet., n. 10, t. j., p. 726. ed. Patav.)