Chapter VIII.—The Method of Classifying Things and Names.
In language there are three things:—Names, which are
primarily the symbols of conceptions, and by consequence also of
subjects. Second, there are Conceptions, which are the likenesses and
impressions of the subjects. Whence in all, the conceptions are the
same; in consequence of the same impression being produced by the
subjects in all. But the names are not so, on account of the difference
of languages. And thirdly, the Subject-matters by which the Conceptions
are impressed in us.
The names are reduced by grammar into the twenty-four
general elements; for the elements must be determined. For of
Particulars there is no scientific knowledge, seeing they are infinite.
But it is the property of science to rest on general and defined
principles. Whence also Particulars are resolved into Universals. And
philosophic research is occupied with Conceptions and Real subjects.
But since of these the Particulars are infinite, some elements have
been found, under which every subject of investigation is brought; and
if it be shown to enter into any one or more of the elements, we prove
it to exist; but if it escape them all, that it does not exist.
Of things stated, some are stated without connection;
as, for example, “man” and “runs,” and whatever
does not complete a sentence, which is either true or false. And of
things stated in connection, some point out “essence,” some
“quality,” some “quantity,” some
“relation,” some “where,” some
“when,” some “position,” some
“possession,” some “action,” some
“suffering,” which we call the elements of material things
after the first principles. For these are capable of being contemplated
by reason.
But immaterial things are capable of being apprehended
by the mind alone, by primary application.
And of those things that are classed under the ten
Categories, some are predicated by themselves (as the nine Categories),
and others in relation to something.
And, again, of the things contained under these
ten Categories, some are
Univocal,
as ox and man, as far as each
is an animal. For those are Univocal terms, to both of which belongs
the common name, animal; and the same principle, that is definition,
that is animate essence. And Heteronyms are those which relate to the
same subject under different names, as ascent or descent; for the way
is the same whether upwards or downwards. And the other species of
Heteronyms, as horse and black, are those which have a different name
and definition from each other, and do not possess the same subject.
But they are to be called different, not Heteronyms. And Polyonyms are
those which have the same definition, but a different name, as, hanger,
sword, scimitar. And Paronyms are those which are named from something
different, as “manly” from
“manliness.”
Equivocal terms have the same name, but not the same
definition, as man—both the animal and the picture. Of Equivocal
terms, some receive their Equivocal name fortuitously, as Ajax, the
Locrian, and the Salaminian; and some from intention; and of these,
some from resemblance, as man both the living and the painted; and some
from analogy, as the foot of Mount Ida, and our foot, because they are
beneath; some from action, as the foot of a vessel, by which the vessel
sails, and our foot, by which we move. Equivocal terms are
designated from the same and to the same; as the book and scalpel are
called surgical, both from the surgeon who uses them and with reference
to the surgical matter itself.