Who would not be dismayed at
this irresistible power of attack? The argument transcends the promise,
the experience is more terrible than the threat. “I will
come,” he says, “to my stronger argument.” What is
it? That as the differences of properties are recognized by those names
which signify the special attributes, we must of course, he says, allow
that differences of essence are also expressed by divergence of names.
What then are these appellations of essences by which we learn the
divergence of Nature between the Father and the son? He talks of fire
and water, air and earth, cold and heat, white and black, triangle and
circle. His illustrations have won him the day: his argument carries
all before it: I cannot contradict the statement that those names which
are entirely incommunicable indicate difference of natures. But our man
of keen and quick-sighted intellect has just missed seeing these
points:—that in this case the Father is God and the Son is God;
that “just,” and “incorruptible,” and all those
names which belong to the Divine Nature, are used equally of the Father
and of the Son; and thus, if the divergent character of appellations
indicates difference of natures, the community of names will surely
show the common character of the essence. And if we must agree that the
Divine essence is to be expressed by names On this
point, besides what follows here, see the treatise against Tritheism
addressed to Ablabius., it
would behove us to apply to that Nature these lofty and Divine names
rather than the terminology of “generate” and
“ungenerate,” because “good” and
“incorruptible,” “just” and “wise,”
and all such terms as these are strictly applicable only to that Nature
which passes all understanding, whereas “generated”
exhibits community of name with even the inferior forms of the lower
creation. For we call a dog, and a frog, and all things that come into
the world by way of generation, “generated.” And moreover,
the term “ungenerate” is not only employed of that which
exists without a cause, but has also a proper application to that which
is nonexistent. The Scindapsus These
are names applied to denote existences purely imaginary; the other
names belong to classical mythology. is called ungenerate,
the Blityri These
are names applied to denote existences purely imaginary; the other
names belong to classical mythology. is ungenerate, the Minotaur is
ungenerate, the Cyclops, Scylla, the Chimæra are ungenerate, not
in the sense of existing without generation, but in the sense of never
having come into being at all. If, then, the names more peculiarly
Divine are common to the Son with the Father, and if it is the others,
those which are equivocally employed either of the non-existent or of
the lower animals—if it is these, I say, which are divergent, let
his “generate and ungenerate” be so: Eunomius’
powerful argument against us itself upholds the cause of truth in
testifying that there is no divergence in respect of nature, because no
divergence can be perceived in the names That
is, in the names more peculiarly appropriate to the Divine
Nature.. But
if he asserts the difference of essence to exist between the
“generate” and the “ungenerate,” as it does
between fire and water, and is of opinion that the names, like those
which he has mentioned in his examples, are in the same mutual relation
as “fire” and “water,” the horrid character of
his blasphemy will here again be brought to light, even if we hold our
peace. For fire and water have a nature mutually destructive, and each is
destroyed, if it comes to be in the other, by the prevalence of the
more powerful element. If, then, he lays down the doctrine that the
Nature of the Ungenerate differs thus from that of the Only-begotten,
it is surely clear that he logically makes this destructive opposition
to be involved in the divergence of their essences, so that their
nature will be, by this reasoning, incompatible and incommunicable, and
the one would be consumed by the other, if both should be found to be
mutually inclusive or co-existent.