sistent with the freedom of man’s Will, consisting in indifference and self-determining
power; because it supposes man to be under a necessity of sinning, and that God requires
things of him, in order to his avoiding eternal damnation, which he is unable to do; and
that this doctrine is wholly inconsistent with the sincerity of counsels, invitations, &c. Now,
this doctrine supposes no other necessity of sinning, than a moral necessity; which, as has
been shown, does not at all excuse sin; and sup-posses no other inability to obey any com-
mand, or perform any duty, even the most spiritual and exalted, but a moral inability, which,
as has been proved, does not excuse persons in the non-performance of any good thing, or
make them not to be the proper objects of commands, counsel, and invitations. And,
moreover, it has been shown, that there is not, and never can be, either in existence, or so
much as in idea, any such freedom of Will, consisting in indifference and self-determination,
for the sake of which, this doctrine of original sin is cast out: and that no such freedom is
necessary, in order to the nature of sin, and a just desert of punishment.
The things which have been observed, do also take off the main objections of Arminians
against the doctrine of efficacious grace; and, at the same time, prove the grace of God in a
sinner’s conversion (if there be any grace or divine influence in the affair) to be efficacious,
yea, and irresistible too, if by irresistible is meant, that which is attended with a moral neces-
sity, which it is impossible should ever be violated by any resistance. The main objection of
Arminians against this doctrine is, that it is inconsistent with their self-determining freedom
of Will; and that it is repugnant to the nature of virtue, that it should be wrought in the heart
by the determining efficacy and power of another, instead of its being owing to a self-moving
power; that, in that case, the good which is wrought, would not be our virtue, but rather
God’s virtue; because not the person in whom it is wrought is the determining author of it,
but God that wrought it in him. But the things which are the foundation of these objections,
have been considered; and it has been demonstrated, that the liberty of moral agents does
not consist in self-determining power; and that there is no need of any such liberty, in order
to the nature of virtue; nor does it at all hinder, but that the state or act of the Will may be
the virtue of the subject, though it be not from self-determination, but the determination
of an intrinsic cause; even so as to cause the event to be morally necessary to the subject of
it.—And as it has been proved, that nothing in the state or acts of the Will of man is contin-
gent; but that, on the contrary, every event of this kind is necessary, by a moral necessity;
arid has also been now demonstrated, that the doctrine of an universal determining
Providence, follows from that doctrine of necessity, which was proved before: and so, that
God does decisively, in his providence, order all the volitions of moral agents, either by
positive influence or permission: and it being allowed, on all hands, that what God does in
the affair of man’s virtuous volitions, whether it be more or less, is by some positive influence,
and not by mere permission, as in the affair of a sinful volition: if we put these things together,
it will follow, that God’s assistance or influence must be determining and decisive, or must
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SECTION XIV. The Conclusion.