Testimonia

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16. For (justification of è á í Ü ô ï õ ã å í ï ì Ý í ï õ, by an appeal to common usage) where a testament is (it is quite in vain to attempt to deny the testamentary sense of ä é á è Þ ê ç in this verse. Many have made the attempt: e. g. Codurcus, in a long excursus, which may be seen in Critici Sacri, vol. vii. part 2, fol. 1067 ff.: Whitby in loc., Seb. Schmidt, Michaelis, al., and recently Ebrard and Hofmann. As these recent expositors have written with the others before them, it may be well to give an account of their views of the passage. Ebrard understands it thus: “Wherever sinful man will enter into a covenant with the holy God, the man must first die,—must first atone for his guilt by death (or must put in a substitute for himself).”This he gives as the summary of his argumentation. But, as Hofmann asks, where does he find one word of this in the general assertion of the Writer? The text speaks axiomatically of something which every one knows in common life. Ebrard interprets theologically: by a declaration which it requires a theologian to accept. The Writer speaks in the abstract—of all διαθῆκαι whatever: Ebrard interprets in the concrete—of one particular set of διαθῆκαι. It is true, Eb. attempts to anticipate this objection, by saying that from the context, every one would know what sort of ä é á è Þ ê ç was meant. But this does not meet it in the least degree. Our verse is a perfectly general axiom, extending over all διαθῆκαι, in whatsoever sense the word be taken. Hofmann on the other hand rejects (Schriftb. ii. 1. 302 ff.) both meanings, testament and covenant, and maintains that of ordinance, disposition, understanding that disposition to extend to the whole property. Then, he says (see also Weissagung u. Erfüllung, ii. 165), “This idea of necessity implies that he must die who makes such a disposition of his whole property: because, as long as he lives, he can be always adding to his property, so that this disposition ( ä é á è Þ ê ç ) cannot be meant to be used of the time while the disposer is alive.”But this, though approaching nearer the true meaning, is just as futile as the other. Why may not a man yet living make such a disposition? And if it cannot be made till death, wherein does it in reality differ from a testament? It would be quite impossible to follow out the various argumentations by which the testamentary sense has been sought to be evaded. It will be far more profitable for us to endeavour to substantiate that which I believe to be the only admissible acceptation. And this I will do by starting from the word itself about which all the question is raised. ä é á è Þ ê ç, from ä é á ô é è Ý í á é, ‘disponere,’ ä é á ô ß è å ó è á é, ‘disponere sibi,’regards, in ordinary Greek usage, that disposition of a man’s property which he makes in prospect of his death, and signifies, 1. a will or testament. So in Plato, Legg. xi. p. 926 B, ὃςἂνδιαθήκηνγράφῃτὰαὐτοῦδιατιθέμενος, and in reff.: in Demosth. 1136. 12, τὴνδιαθήκην, ἣνἂνγνησίωνὄντωνπαίδωνὁπατὴρδιάθηται, ἐᾶνἀποθάνωσινοἱπαῖδεςπρὶνἡβῆσαι, κυρίανεἶναι, and al. On the other hand, the word is by no means tied to this its more usual meaning. The general one, of a disposition of any kind, is sometimes found applied to other circumstances than those at the close of life. So Aristoph. Av. 439, where Peisthetærus says, μὰτὸνἈπόλλω ʼ γὼμὲνοὔ, ἣνμὴδιαθῶνταίγ ʼ οἵδεδιαθήκηνἐμοί, … μήτεδάκνειντούτουςἐμὲκ. ô. ë.: where it evidently means a covenant, an agreement. And in this sense, either where there are two distinct parties, or where one only arranges or ordains a ‘dispositio,’do we find the word most often used in the LXX and N. T. In the former sense, 2. of a covenant, with two agreeing parties, it is not so frequent as in the latter: but we find it Genesis 21:27; Genesis 21:32, διέθεντοἀμφότεροιδιαθήκην: in Job 40:23 (Job 41:4) of Leviathan, θήσεταιδὲμετὰσοῦδιαθήκην: 2 Kings 3:12; Joshua 9:6; Joshua 9:11 al. fr. The other sense, 3. that of a disposition or ordinance made by God ð ñ ü ò ô é í á, or ì å ô Ü ô é í ï ò, is the most ordinary one in the LXX. To it may be referred almost all the passages where in a loose sense of the word we in English render ‘covenant:’e. g. Genesis 6:18; Genesis 9:9 &c.; Genesis 15:18; and a hundred other places. In this latter sense it is that the word has come to be used absolutely and technically as in ἡκιβωτὸςτῆςδιαθήκης, ἡδιαθήκηκυρίου, &c.: and in the quotation in our ch. Hebrews 8:8 ff. Now, having these there leading senses of the word before us, we are to enquire, which of them our Writer is likely to have intended when he wrote as a general axiom, ὅπουδιαθήκη, θάνατονἀνάγκηφέρεσθαιτοῦδιαθεμένου. It is obvious that in no general axiomatic sense can it be predicated of a covenant, or of an ordinance. There may be particular instances where a death (setting aside for a moment τοῦδιαθεμένου ) might have been the requisite ratification of a covenant, or result of an ordinance: but such particular cases are clearly not here in question. Only when we recur to sense (1), that of a testament, can it be true, that where a ä é á è Þ ê ç is, there must of necessity be death, and that, the death τοῦδιαθεμένου, of him who has made the testament. And if it be objected to this, that a testament may exist many years before the death of the testator, the answer is easy, that the Writer here detines his own meaning of ὅπουδιαθήκη, when he says διαθήκηγὰρἐπὶνεκροῖςβεβαία: viz. that the document in question does not in reality become a ä é á è Þ ê ç, a disposition, till it is of force, till things are disposed by it. I believe then it will be found that we must at all hazards accept the meaning testament here, as being the only one which will in any way meet the plain requirements of the verse) there is necessity that the death ( è Ü í á ô ï í is prefixed before ἀνάγκη, as carrying the whole weight of emphasis, and is for this reason also anarthrous) of him who made it (the testator, as E. V., but it is important to mark that it is ä é á è å ì Ý í ï õ, not ä é á ô é è å ì Ý í ï õ, as it ought to be on the interpretation of Ebr. al. In the meaning, Christ is the ä é á è Ý ì å í ï ò: and this agrees wonderfully with St. Luke’s manner of speaking in that text which is in fact the key-text to this: κἀγὼδιατίθεμαιὑμῖνκαθὼςδιέθετόμοιὁπατήρμουβασιλείαν, Luke 22:29. There the great and primary ä é á è Ý ì å í ï ò is the Father, who is not here in question, as neither is His ä é á è Þ ê ç with His Son: but as regards us, the ä é á è Ý ì å í ï ò is Christ; to whom alone, as human, the axiom, spoken of human relations, is applicable, and not to the divine Father. And when Ebrard insists on the former of these facts, and altogether omits noticing the second, saying that according to our interpretation God Himself must have died, we can only marvel at this fresh instance of the inconceivable rashness and carelessness which unfortunately characterize his spirited and clever commentary) be implied (it is not easy to express the exact sense of ö Ý ñ å ó è á é here. For we must remember, 1. that we have had è á í Ü ô ï õ ã å í ï ì Ý í ï õ in Hebrews 9:15, quite far enough off to prevent it being probable that ö Ý ñ å ó è á é is a mere rhetorical elegance to avoid repeating ã å í Ý ó è á é, and inducing us to think that some meaning different from ã å í Ý ó è á é is here intended: even could it be shewn that ö Ý ñ å ó è á é could bear to be rendered = ã å í Ý ó è á é, which I am not aware that it has been: 2. that in looking for a sense for ö Ý ñ å ó è á é, we must be careful not to give too pregnant or emphatic an one, seeing that it holds a very insignificant and unemphatic place in the sentence. This being premised, I believe the most suitable sense will be found in such phrases as πάσαςαἰτίαςφέρειν, to allege all grounds, Demosth. p. 1328. 22; ð á ñ á ä å ß ã ì á ô á ö Ý ñ å é í, to produce examples, Polyb. xvii. 13. 7; φέρειντινὶτοὺςἀπολογισμούς, to make one’s apologies to, id. i. 32. 4. And of these I would take ‘alleged,’ ‘carried in to the matter,’in fact, ‘implied,’which seems the best word: he who speaks of ä é á è Þ ê ç, ( ἅμα ) ö Ý ñ å é, carries in to, involves in, that assertion, the death of the ä é á è Ý ì å í ï ò. On the logical connexion, see below):

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