But let us resume the
examination of his words in order. “Each Being has in fact and
conception a nature unmixed, single, and absolutely one, as estimated
by its dignity.” Why “as estimated by its dignity?”
If he contemplates the Beings in their common dignity, this addition is
unnecessary and superfluous, and dwells upon that which is obvious:
although a word so out of place might be pardoned, if it was any
feeling of reverence which prompted him not to reject it. But here the
mischief really is not owing to a mistake about a phrase (that might be
easily set right): but it is connected with his evil designs. He says
that each of the three beings is ‘single, as estimated by its
dignity,’ in order that, on the strength of his previous
definitions of the first, second, and third Being, the idea of their
simplicity also may be marred. Having affirmed that the being of the
Father alone is ‘Supreme’ and ‘Proper,’ and
having refused both these titles to that of the Son and of the Spirit,
in accordance with this, when he comes to speak of them all as
‘simple,’ he thinks it his duty to associate with them the
idea of simplicity in proportion only to their essential worth, so that
the Supreme alone is to be conceived of as at the height and perfection
of simplicity, while the second, in proportion to its declension from
supremacy, receives also a diminished measure of simplicity, and in the
case of the third Being also, there is as much variation from the
perfect simplicity, as the amount of worth is lessened in the extremes:
whence it results that the Father’s being is conceived as of pure
simplicity, that of the Son as not so flawless in simplicity, but with
a mixture of the composite, that of the Holy Spirit as still increasing
in the composite, while the amount of simplicity is gradually lessened.
Just as imperfect goodness must be owned to share in some measure in
the reverse disposition, so imperfect simplicity cannot escape being
considered composite.