§19. His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is ‘single’ is only verbal.
“Each Being has, in fact and in conception, a nature unmixed, single, and absolutely
one as estimated by its dignity; and as the works are bounded by the energies of each oper-
ator, and the energies by the works, it is inevitable that the energies which follow each Being
are greater in the one case than the other, some being of the first, others of the second rank.”
The intention that runs through all this, however verbosely expressed, is one and the same;
namely, to establish that there is no connexion between the Father and the Son, or between
the Son and the Holy Ghost, but that these Beings are sundered from each other, and possess
natures foreign and unfamiliar to each other, and differ not only in that, but also in magnitude
and in subordination of their dignities, so that we must think of one as greater than the
other, and presenting every other sort of difference.
It may seem to many useless to linger over what is so obvious, and to attempt a discussion
of that which to them is on the face of it false and abominable and groundless: nevertheless,
to avoid even the appearance of having to let these statements pass for want of counter-ar-
guments, we will meet them with all our might. He says, “each being amongst them is un-
mixed, single, and absolutely one, as estimated by its dignity, both in fact and in conception.”
Then premising this very doubtful statement as an axiom and valuing his own ‘ipse dixit’
as a sufficient substitute for any proof, he thinks he has made a point. “There are three Be-
ings:” for he implies this when he says, ‘each being amongst them:’ he would not have used
these words, if he meant only one. Now if he speaks thus of the mutual difference between
the Beings in order to avoid complicity with the heresy of Sabellius, who applied three titles
to one subject, we would acquiesce in his statement: nor would any of the Faithful contradict
his view, except so far as he seems to be at fault in his names, and his mere form of expression
in speaking of ‘beings’ instead of ‘persons:’ for things that are identical on the score of being
will not all agree equally in definition on the score of personality. For instance, Peter, James,
and John are the same viewed as beings, each was a man: but in the characteristics of their
respective personalities, they were not alike. If, then, he were only proving that it is not right
to confound the Persons, and to fit all the three names on to one Subject, his ‘saying’ would
be, to use the Apostle’s words, ‘faithful, and worthy of all acceptation113.’ But this is not his
object: he speaks so, not because he divides the Persons only from each other by their recog-
nized characteristics, but because he makes the actual substantial being of each different
from that of the others, or rather from itself: and so he speaks of a plurality of beings with
distinctive differences which alienate them from each other. I therefore declare that his view
is unfounded, and lacks a principle: it starts from data that are not granted, and then it
113 1 Timothy i. 15.
His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is 'single' is only verbal.
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His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is 'single' is only verbal.