of that choice; or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition; whether
it was caused by some external motive, or internal habitual bias; whether it was determined
by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause; whether it
was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come
by his choice any how, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing
and executing his will, the man is perfectly free, according to, the primary and common
notion of freedom.
What has been said may be sufficient to show what is meant by Liberty, according to
the common notions of mankind, and in the usual and primary acceptation of the word:
but the word, as used by Arminians, Pelagians, and others, who oppose the Calvinists, has
an entirely different signification.—These several things belong to their notion of Liberty.
1. That it consists in a self-determining power in the Will, or a certain sovereignty the Will
has over itself, and its own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions; so as not to be de-
pendent, in its determinations, on any cause without itself, nor determined by any thing
prior to its own acts. 2. Indifference belongs to Liberty in their notion of it, or that the mind,
previous to the act of volition, be in equilibrio. 3. Contingence is another thing that belongs
and is essential to it; not in the common acceptation of the word, as that has been already
explained, but as opposed to all necessity, or any fixed and certain connexion with some
previous ground or reason of its existence. They suppose the essence of Liberty so much to
consist in these things, that unless the will of man be free in this sense, he has no real freedom,
how much soever, he may be at Liberty to act according to his will.
A moral Agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a moral quality, and
which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious,
commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a moral faculty, or sense of moral good
and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishments;
and a capacity which an Agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements
or motives, exhibited to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct
agreeable to the moral faculty.
The sun is very excellent and beneficial in its action and influence on the earth, in
warming and causing it to bring forth its fruit; but it is not a moral agent: its action, though
good, is not virtuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks out in a city, and consumes great part
of it, is very mischievous in its operation; but is not a moral Agent: what it does is not faulty
or sinful, or deserving of any punishment. The brute creatures are not moral Agents: the
actions of some of them are very profitable and pleasant; others are very hurtful: yet seeing
they have no moral faculty, or sense of desert, and do not act from choice guided by under-
standing, or with a capacity of reasoning and reflecting, but only from instinct, and are not
capable of being influenced by moral inducements, their actions are not properly sinful or
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SECTION V. Concerning the notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency.