304 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK XII.
from tlience, and absorbing as it were into the belly, so laid up
in the memory, over this it will be able to ruminate in some
measure by recollection, and to transfer what it has thus
learned into systematic knowledge. But if this has been
blotted out by absolute forgetfulness, yet once again, under the
guidance of teaching, one will come to that which had alto-
gether dropped away, and it will be found such as it was.
Chap. xv.—In opposition to the reminiscence of Plato and Pythagoras. Pytha-
goras the Samlan. Of the difference between wisdom and knowledge, and
of seeking the Trinity in the knowledge of temporal things.
24. And hence that noble philosopher Plato endeavoured to
persuade us that the souls of men lived here even before they
bare these bodies; and that hence those things which are learnt,
are rather remembered as haying been known already, than
taken into knowledge as things new. Tor he has told us that
a boy,when questioned I know not what respecting geometry,
replied as if he were perfectly skilled in that branch of learn-
ing. For being questioned step by step and skilfully, he saw
what was to be seen, and said that which he saw. But if this
had been a recollecting of things previously known, then cer-
tainly every one, or almost every one, would not have been
able so to answer when questioned. For not every one was a
geometrician in the former life, since geometricians are so few
among men that scarcely one can be found anywhere. But
we ought rather to believe, that the intellectual mind is so
formed in its nature as to see those things, which by the dis-
position of the Creator are subjoined to things intelligible in a
natural order, by a sort of incorporeal light of an unique kind ;
as the eye of the flesh sees things adjacent to itself in this
bodily light, of which light it is made to be receptive, and
adapted to it. For none the more does this fleshly eye, too,
distinguish black things from white without a teacher, because
it had already known them before it was created in this flesh.
Why, lastly, is it possible only in intelligible things that any
one properly questioned should answer according to any branch
of learning, although ignorant of it ? Why can no one do this
with things sensible, except those which he has seen in this
his present body, or has believed the information of others who
knew them, whether somebody's writings or words ? For we