I will pass by these matters,
however, as the absurdity involved is evident; let us examine what
precedes. He says that nothing else is found, “besides the
essence of the Son, which admits of the generation.” What does he
mean when he says this? He distinguishes two names from each other, and
separating by his discourse the things signified by them, he sets each
of them individually apart by itself. “The generation” is
one name, and “the essence” is another. The essence, he
tells us, “admits of the generation,” being therefore of
course something distinct from the generation. For if the generation
were the essence (which is the very thing he is constantly declaring),
so that the two appellations are equivalent in sense, he would not have
said that the essence “admits of the generation”: for that
would amount to saying that the essence admits of the essence, or the
generation the generation,—if, that is, the generation were the
same thing as the essence. He understands, then, the generation to be
one thing, and the essence to be another, which “admits of
generation”: for that which is taken cannot be the same with that
which admits it. Well, this is what the sage and systematic statement
of our author says: but as to whether there is any sense in his words,
let him consider who is expert in judging. I will resume his actual
words.