We do learn, she replied, much
about many things by this very same method, inasmuch as, in the very
act of saying a thing is “not so and so,” we by implication
interpret the very nature of the thing in question Remove comma after ζητουμένου, in Paris Editt.. For instance, when we say a
“guileless,” we indicate a good man; when we say
“unmanly,” we have expressed that a man is a coward; and it
is possible to suggest a great many things in like fashion, wherein we
either convey the idea of goodness by the negation of badness or
vice versâ, i.e. the idea of badness
by the negation of goodness. Krabinger appositely quotes a passage from
Plotinus: “Who could picture to himself evil as a specific thing,
appearing as it does only in the absence of each good?…it will be
necessary for all who are to know what evil is to have a clear
conception about good: since even in dealing with real species the
better take precedence of the worse; and evil is not even a species,
but rather a negation.” Cf. Origen, In Johan. p. 66
A, πᾶσα ἡ
κακία οὐδέν
ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ
καὶ οὐκ ὂν
τυγχάνει. See also Gregory’s Great Catechism, cap. v. and
vii., or vice versâ. Well, then, if
one thinks so with regard to the matter now before us, one will not
fail to gain a proper conception of it. The question is,—What are
we to think of Mind in its very essence? Now granted that the inquirer
has had his doubts set at rest as to the existence of the thing in
question, owing to the activities which it displays to us, and only
wants to know what it is, he will have adequately discovered it by
being told that it is not that which our senses perceive, neither a
colour, nor a form, nor a hardness, nor a weight, nor a quantity, nor a
cubic dimension, nor a point, nor anything else perceptible in matter;
supposing, that is, supposing, that is. This only repeats
what was said above: “granted that the inquirer has had his
doubts set at rest as to the existence of the thing.” It is the
reading of Krabinger (εἰ
δή τι), and the best.
Sifanus follows the less supported reading οἶδεν
ὅτι, which is open to the
further objection that it would be absurd to say, “when a man
learns that A is not B he knows that it is something else.” The
reading of the Paris. Editt. ἴδῃ
is unintelligible. that there does
exist a something beyond all these.