XI.  And now, having purified the theatre by what has been said, let us discourse a little about the Festival, and join in celebrating this Feast with festal and pious souls.  And, since the chief point of the Festival is the remembrance of God, let us call God to mind.  For I think that the sound of those who keep Festival There, where is the dwelling of all the Blissful, is nothing else than this, the hymns and praises of God, sung by all who are counted worthy of that City.  Let none be astonished if what I have to say contains some things that I have said before; for not only will I utter the same words, but I shall speak of the same subjects, trembling both in tongue and mind and thought when I speak of God for you too, that you may share this laudable and blessed feeling.  And when I speak of God you must be illumined at once by one flash of light and by three.  Three in Individualities or Hypostases, if any prefer so to call them, or persons, The sense of Person (here πρόσωπον), which is the usual post-Nicene equivalent of ὑπόστασις, was by no means generally attached to that word during the first Four Centuries, though here and there there are traces of such a use.  Throughout the Arian controversy a great deal of trouble and misunderstanding was caused by the want of a precise definition of the meaning of ὑπόστασις.  It seems to have been at first understood by the Eastern Church to mean Real Personal Existence—Reality being the fundamental idea.  In this fundamental sense it was used in Theology as expressing the distinct individuality and relative bearing of the Three “Persons” of the Blessed Trinity to each other (τὸ ἴδίον πὰρα τὸ κοινόν, Suidas).  But Arius gave it a heretical twist, and said that there are Three Hypostases, in the sense of Natures or Substances; and this doctrine was anathematized by the Nicene Council, which, apparently regarding the term ὑπόστασις as exactly equivalent to οὐσία (as Arius tried to make it) condemned the proposition that the Son is ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας (Symb. Nic.).  Similar is the use of the word in S. Athanasius.  As against Sabellius, however, who taught that in the Godhead there are τρία πρόσωπα (using this word in the sense of Aspects only) but would not allow τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις (i.e., Self-existent Personalities), the post-Nicene Church regarded ὑπόστασις as designating the Person, and spoke freely of τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις.  The Western Church increased the confusion by continuing to regard ὑπόστασις as equivalent to οὐσία, and translating it by Substantia or Subsistentia.  It was not till the word Essentia came into use to express οὐσία that the Western Church grasped the difference, so long accepted in the East, so as to use the words accurately.  Meantime, however, there would seem to have grown up a difference in the use of the two words supposed to represent ὑπόστασις, of the same kind as that between ὑπόστασις and οὐσία; Substantia being appropriated to the Essence of a thing, that which is the foundation of its being; while Subsistentia came rather to connote a limitation, i.e., Personality.  Thus the West also became confused, and Substantia was held to be the true equivalent of ὑπόστασις.  Hence the condemnation at Sardica (a.d. 347) by the Western Bishops of the doctrine of Three Hypostases as Arian.  The confusion lasted long, but in 362 a Council was held at Alexandria, when this difference was seen to be a mere logomachy, and it was pronounced orthodox to confess either τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις in the sense of “Persons,” or μἰαν ὑπόστασιν in that of “Substance.”  Our author in his Oration to the Fathers of the Council of Constantinople fully acknowledges this.  “What do you mean,” he says, “by ὑποστάσεις or πρόσωπα?  You mean that the Three are distinct, not in Nature, but in Personality.”  And in the Panegyric on S. Athanasius (Or. xxi. c. 35), he remarks on the orthodoxy of the phrase μία οὐσία, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, that the first expression refers to the Nature of the Godhead, the second to the special properties of the Persons.  With this, he says, the Italians agree, but the poverty of their language is such that it does not admit of the distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, and therefore has to call in the word πρόσωπον, which if misunderstood is liable to be charged with Sabellianism. for we will not quarrel about names so long as the syllables amount to the same meaning; but One in respect of the Substance—that is, the Godhead.  For they are divided without division, if I may so say; and they are united in division.  For the Godhead is one in three, and the three are one, in whom the Godhead is, or to speak more accurately, Who are the Godhead.  Excesses and defects we will omit, neither making the Unity a confusion, nor the division a separation.  We would keep equally far from the confusion of Sabellius and from the division of Arius, which are evils diametrically opposed, yet equal in their wickedness.  For what need is there heretically to fuse God together, or to cut Him up into inequality?