31. A certain neutral character, then, and undecided and doubtful nature of the soul,
has made room for philosophy, and found out a reason for its being sought after: while, that
is, that fellow3611 is full of dread because of evil deeds of which he is guilty; another conceives
great hopes if he shall do no evil, and pass his life in obedience to3612 duty and justice.
Thence it is that among learned men, and men endowed with excellent abilities, there is
strife as to the nature of the soul, and some say that it is subject to death, and cannot take
upon itself the divine substance; while others maintain that it is immortal, and cannot sink
under the power of death.3613 But this is brought about by the law ofthe soul’s neutral
character:3614 because, on the one hand, arguments present themselves to the one party by
which it is found that the soul3615 is capable of suffering, and perishable; and, on the other
hand, are not wanting to their opponents, by which it is shown that the soul is divine and
immortal.
3611 i.e., the abandoned and dissolute immortal spoken of in last chapter.
3612 Lit., “with.”
3613 Lit., “degenerate into mortal nature.”
3614 Arnobius seems in this chapter to refer to the doctrine of the Stoics, that the soul must be material, because,
unless body and soul were of one substance, there could be no common feeling or mutual affection (so Cleanthes
in Nemes. de Nat. Hom., ii. p. 33); and to that held by some of them, that only the souls of the wise remained
after death, and these only till the conflagration (Stob., Ecl. Phys., p. 372) which awaits the world, and ends the
Stoic great year or cycle. Others, however, held that the souls of the wise became dæmons and demigods (Diog.,
Lært., vii. 157 and 151).
3615 Lit., “they”—eas.
Chapter XXXI.
1032
Chapter XXXI.