chariot and the pair of horses of dissimilar forces yoked to it, and their driver, whereby the
philosopher allegorizes these facts about the soul; we must neglect also all that is said by the
philosopher who succeeded him and who followed out probabilities by rules of art1785, and
diligently investigated the very question now before us, declaring that the soul was mortal1786
by reason of these two principles; we must neglect all before and since their time, whether
they philosophized in prose or in verse, and we will adopt, as the guide of our reasoning,
the Scripture, which lays it down as an axiom that there is no excellence in the soul which
is not a property as well of the Divine nature. For he who declares the soul to be God’s
likeness asserts that anything foreign to Him is outside the limits of the soul; similarity
cannot be retained in those qualities which are diverse from the original. Since, then, nothing
of the kind we are considering is included in the conception of the Divine nature, one would
be reasonable in surmising that such things are not consubstantial with the soul either. Now
to seek to build up our doctrine by rule of dialectic and the science which draws and destroys
conclusions, involves a species of discussion which we shall ask to be excused from, as being
a weak and questionable way of demonstrating truth. Indeed, it is clear to every one that
that subtle dialectic possesses a force that may be turned both ways, as well for the overthrow
of truth1787 as for the detection of falsehood; and so we begin to suspect even truth itself
when it is advanced in company with such a kind of artifice, and to think that the very in-
1785 i.e.the syllogism.
1786 that the soul was mortal. Aristotle, guided only by probabilities as discoverable by the syllogism, does
indeed define the soul, “the first entelechy of a physical, potentially living, and organic body.” Entelechy is more
than mere potentiality: it is “developed force” (“dormant activity;” see W. Archer Butler’s Lectures, ii. p. 393),
capable of manifestation. The human soul, uniting in itself all the faculties of the other orders of animate existence,
is a Microcosm. The other parts of the soul are inseparable from the body, and are hence perishable (De Animâ,
ii. 2); but the νοῦς exists before the body, into which it enters from without as something divine and immortal
(De Gen. Animal. ii. 3). But he makes a distinction between the form-receiving, and the form-giving νοῦς: sub-
stantial eternal existence belongs only to the latter (De Animâ, iii. 5). The secret of the difference between him
and Plato, with whom “all the soul is immortal” (Phædrus, p. 245 C), lies in this; that Plato regarded the soul as
always in motion, while Aristotle denied it, in itself, any motion at all. “It is one of the things that are impossible
that motion should exist in it” (De Animâ, i. 4). It cannot be moved at all; therefore it cannot move itself. Plotinus
and Porphyry, as well as Nemesius the Platonizing Bishop of Emesa (whose treatise De Animâis wrongly attributed
to Gregory), attacked this teaching of an “entelechy.” Cf. also Justin Martyr (ad Græc. cohort, c. 6, p. 12); “Plato
declares that all the soul is immortal; Aristotle calls her an ‘entelechy,’ and not immortal. The one says she is
ever-moving, the other that she is never-moving, but prior to all motion.” Also Gregory Naz., Orat. xxvii. “Away
with Aristotle’s calculating Providence, and his art of logic, and his dead reasonings about the soul, and purely
human doctrine!”
1787 for the overthrow of the truth. So c. Eunom. iii. (ii. 500).
816
On the Soul and the Resurrection.