some instance of transcendent generosity, whereby he has been relieved from the most ex-
treme calamity, and brought into very opulent, honourable, and happy circumstances, by
a benefactor of excellent character; and yet expresses no more gratitude on such an occasion,
than would be requisite for some kindness comparatively infinitely small, he may justly fall
under the imputation of vile unthankfulness, and of much more ingratitude than gratitude;
though he may have no ill will to his benefactor, or no positive affection of mind contrary
to thankfulness and benevolence. What is odious in him is his defect, whereby he falls so
vastly below his duty.
Dr. Turnbull abundantly insists, that the forces of the affections naturally in man are
well proportioned; and often puts a question to this purpose,—How man’s nature could
have been better constituted in this respect? How the affections of his heart could have been
better proportioned?—I will now mention one instance, out of many that might be men-
tioned. Man, if his heart were not depraved, might have had a disposition to gratitude to
God for his goodness, in proportion to his disposition to anger towards men for their injuries.
When I say, in proportion, I mean considering the greatness and number of favours and
injuries, and the degree in which the one and the other are unmerited, and the benefit re-
ceived by the former, and the damage sustained by the latter. Is there not an apparent and
vast difference and inequality in the dispositions to these two kinds of affection, in the
generality of both old and young, adult persons and little children? How ready is resentment
for injuries received from men! And how easily is it raised in most, at least to an equality
with the desert! And is it so with respect to gratitude for benefits received from God, in any
degree of comparison? Dr. Turnbull pleads for the natural disposition to anger for injuries,
as being good and useful: but surely gratitude to God, if we were inclined to it, would be at
least as good and useful as the other.
How far the generality of mankind are from their duty, with respect to love to God, will
further appear, if we consider that we are obliged not only to love him with a love of gratitude
for benefits received; but true love to God primarily consists in a supreme regard to him for
156
what he is in himself. The tendency of true virtue is to treat every thing as it is, and according
to its nature. And if we regard the Most High according to the infinite dignity and glory of
his nature, we shall esteem and love him with all our heart and soul, and to the utmost of
the capacity of our nature, on this account; and not primarily because he has promoted our
interest. If God be infinitely excellent in himself, then he is infinitely lovely on that account;
or in other words, infinitely worthy to be loved. And doubtless, if he be worthy to be loved
for this, then he ought to be loved for it. And it is manifest, there can be no true love to him,
if he be not loved for what he is in himself. For if we love him not for his own sake, but for
something else, then our love is not terminated on him, but on something else, as its ultimate
object. That is no true value for infinite worth, which implies no value for that worthiness
in itself considered, but only on the account of something foreign. Our esteem of God is
960
SECTION V. All have more sin than virtue.