Chapter 2.—How Varro, by Removing All the Differences Which Do Not Form Sects,
But are Merely Secondary Questions, Reaches Three Definitions of the Chief Good, of Which
We Must Choose One.
The same may be said of those three kinds of life, the life of studious leisure and search
after truth, the life of easy engagement in affairs, and the life in which both these are mingled.
When it is asked, which of these should be adopted, this involves no controversy about the
end of good, but inquires which of these three puts a man in the best position for finding
and retaining the supreme good. For this good, as soon as a man finds it, makes him happy;
but lettered leisure, or public business, or the alternation of these, do not necessarily constitute
happiness. Many, in fact, find it possible to adopt one or other of these modes of life, and
yet to miss what makes a man happy. The question, therefore, regarding the supreme good
and the supreme evil, and which distinguishes sects of philosophy, is one; and these questions
concerning the social life, the doubt of the Academy, the dress and food of the Cynics, the
three modes of life—the active, the contemplative, and the mixed—these are different
questions, into none of which the question of the chief good enters. And therefore, as
Marcus Varro multiplied the sects to the number of 288 (or whatever larger number he
chose) by introducing these four differences derived from the social life, the New Academy,
the Cynics, and the threefold form of life, so, by removing these differences as having no
bearing on the supreme good, and as therefore not constituting what can properly be called
sects, he returns to those twelve schools which concern themselves with inquiring what that
good is which makes man happy, and he shows that one of these is true, the rest false. In
other words, he dismisses the distinction founded on the threefold mode of life, and so de-
creases the whole number by two-thirds, reducing the sects to ninety-six. Then, putting
aside the Cynic peculiarities, the number decreases by a half, to forty-eight. Taking away
next the distinction occasioned by the hesitancy of the New Academy, the number is again
halved, and reduced to twenty-four. Treating in a similar way the diversity introduced by
the consideration of the social life, there are left but twelve, which this difference had doubled
to twenty-four. Regarding these twelve, no reason can be assigned why they should not be
called sects. For in them the sole inquiry is regarding the supreme good and the ultimate
evil,—that is to say, regarding the supreme good, for this being found, the opposite evil is
thereby found. Now, to make these twelve sects, he multiplies by three these four
things—pleasure, repose, pleasure and repose combined, and the primary objects of nature
which Varro calls primigenia. For as these four things are sometimes subordinated to virtue,
so that they seem to be desired not for their own sake, but for virtue’s sake; sometimes pre-
ferred to it, so that virtue seems to be necessary not on its own account, but in order to attain
these things; sometimes joined with it, so that both they and virtue are desired for their own
sakes,—we must multiply the four by three, and thus we get twelve sects. But from those
How Varro, by Removing All the Differences Which Do Not Form Sects, But are Merely Secondary Questions, Reaches Three Definitions of the Chief Good, of Which We Must Choose One.
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How Varro, by Removing All the Differences Which Do Not Form Sects, But…