It being so much insisted on by Arminian writers, that necessity is inconsistent with
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law or command, and particularly, that it is absurd to suppose God by his command should
require that of men which they are unable to do; not allowing in this case for any difference
between natural and moral Inability; I would therefore now particularly consider this mat-
ter.—And for greater clearness I would distinctly lay down the following things.
I. The Will itself, and not only those actions which are the effects of the Will, is the
proper object of Precept or Command. That is, such a state or acts of men’s Wills, are in
many cases properly required of them by Commands; and not only those alterations in the
state of their bodies or minds that are the consequences of volition. This is most manifest;
for it is the soul only that is properly and directly the subject of Precepts or Commands;
with the free agent in his act of choice, in such a sense, as that the choice would not be the genuine effect of the
motive; or, that the nature of the fruit should not correspond with the nature of the tree; but some extraneous
force interposing would make the nature of the volition to be different form the nature of the mind or disposition,
which other wise would be its immediate cause. 11. Divine influence is admitted to be requisite, in order to
prepare the state of the mind for a right choice, even as a good tree is requisite for the good fruit; but this is no
interference with the act of choice itself, nor has it the least tendency to break the connexion between motive
and choice, or between the mind and its volition.—Such influence, indeed, forms one glorious link of the decretive
chain, which the sovereign Governor has established as so many antecedents; and a right choice, in a free agent
thus divinely influenced, or formed anew, is the unrestrained and unimpelled effect which follows by a necessity
of consequence. In other words, no bad choice can possibly follow, but by a failure in the cause, the mind or
disposition itself. 12. On this principle it is, that the sovereign Being himself never errs in his choice. The source
from which the act of choice proceeds is perfectly good, (an infinitely holy nature,) and the connexion between
this cause and the effect, which is a right choice, is infallibly and in the nature of things necessarily secure. Hence
it is that we never admit, or suspect, an error in his choice, however great his freedom; and hence we have a firm
ground of confidence, that the Judge of the whole earth will do right. 13. The three qualifications mentioned
belong to man as a free agent; but we must not confound this idea with that of a subject of moral government.
An infant may be the subject of government, both human and divine; but cannot be, properly speaking, a free
agent. Hence it follows that the first of the qualifications mentioned alone is essential to constitute a subject of
moral government, in a the most extensive sense of the term; but in order to constitute that class of subjects
who are also free agents, the other two are essential. 14. When these three qualifications are found in any free
agent, nothing more is requisite to constitute moral obligation. An end is proposed—means firmly connected
with that end are afforded, and required to be used - these means are physically in the power of the agent - who
is also free from all constraint and compulsion in his act of choice. If these qualifications are not sufficient
morally to oblige, we are fully persuaded nothing can be sufficient.—As to the notion, that moral ability is ne-
cessary to constitute moral obligation, which is maintained alike by many Arminians and most Antinomians,
)for extremes will sometimes meet,) our author abundantly demonstrates its futility and absurd contradic-
tions.—W.
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SECTION IV. Command and Obligation of Obedience, consistent with moral…