Chapter VI.—The Falsity of the General Opinion respecting Fate3389is proved by the
Consideration of Human Laws, and by the Works of Creation, the Course of which is not
Fortuitous, but according to an Orderly Arrangement which evinces the Design of the Creator.
The great majority, however, in their folly, ascribe the regulation of the universe to
nature, while some imagine fate, or accident,3390 to be the cause. With regard to those who
attribute the control of all things to fate, they know not that in using this term they utter a
mere word, but designate no active power, nor anything which has real and substantial ex-
istence. For what can this fate be, considered in itself, if nature be the first cause of all things?
Or what shall we suppose nature itself to be, if the law of fate be inviolable? Indeed, the very
assertion that there is a law of fate implies that such law is the work of a legislator: if, therefore,
fate itself be a law, it must be a law devised by God. All things, therefore, are subject to God,
and nothing is beyond the sphere of his power. If it be said that fate is the will3391 of God,
and is so considered, we admit the fact. But in what respect do justice,3392 or self-control,3393
3389 For a full discussion of various definitions and usage of the word Fate (ἡ εἰριαρμένη) in Greek philosophy,
compare Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (Lond. 1880), p. 170–171, notes.
3390 αὐτόματον. The usual word for chance or accident is τύχη. These may be here, as is often the case, simple
synonyms, but both words are used in the same phrase later in such way as to suggest that τύχη is parallel with
“fate” rather than “chance” in the author’s mind. αὐτόματον seems to be used of “self-originating,” τύχη of
originating from some unknown cause or without any cause. The former is the modern, self-energized, “lift-
yourselves-by-your-own-boot-straps” evolution. The latter is a form of agnosticism. Aristotle (Metaph. 10. 8)
defines chance (τύχη) as a “cause by accident” (συμβέβηκος), or more literally “coincidence,” which is substantially
what Janet (Final Causes, 1878, p. 19) means by defining chance as the coincidence of causes. At the end of the
same chapter Aristotle uses αὐτόματον in contrast with τύχη—“τύχη or even αὐτόματον,” which has been
rendered (M’Mahon) “chance or even spontaneity.” In modern phrase those who hold these three various views
of the universe might be characterized as “material evolutionists,” “transcendental idealists,” and “philosophical
(or perhaps ‘agnostic’) evolutionists.”
3391 i.e. “plan.”
3392 δικαιοσύνη, better “righteousness,” “correctness of thinking, feeling, and acting” (Thayer, Lex. p. 149).
So its opposite mentioned below (ἀδικία) is better “unrighteousness,” as generally in the revised English version
of the N.T., “mammon of unrighteousness” (Luke xvi. 9, e.g.). The word means more than our “just,” “more,”
as Socrates said (Plat. Rep. 1. 331), “than to speak the truth and pay your debts.” Righteousness is the better
translation, but we are met with the difficulty that it has generally been rendered justice in translations of the
philosophers.
3393 σωφροσύνη, temperance, vs. ἀκολασία, intemperance, below; soundness of mind vs. insanity (cf. use in
Acts xxvi. 25, and of verb in Mark v. 15; Luke viii. 35; also use in Plato, Rep. 332, &c.); self-control vs. unbridled
desire. This same contrast of σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία is found in Aristotle, Eth. 2, vii. 3; 7, vii. I; and especially
7, ix. 5.
The Falsity of the General Opinion respecting Fate is proved by the Consideration of Human Laws, and by the Works of Creation, the Course of which is not Fortuitous, but according to an Orderly Arrangement which evinces the Design of the Creator.
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The Falsity of the General Opinion respecting Fate is proved by the Consideration…