Chapter 14.—Of the Opinion of
Those Who Have Said that Rational Souls are of Three Kinds, to Wit,
Those of the Celestial Gods, Those of the Aerial Demons, and Those
of Terrestrial Men.
There is, say they, a threefold
division of all animals endowed with a rational soul, namely, into
gods, men, and demons. The gods occupy the loftiest region, men
the lowest, the demons the middle region. For the abode of the
gods is heaven, that of men the earth, that of the demons the
air. As the dignity of their regions is diverse, so also is that
of their natures; therefore the gods are better than men and
demons. Men have been placed below the gods and demons, both in
respect of the order of the regions they inhabit, and the
difference of their merits. The demons, therefore, who hold the
middle place, as they are inferior to the gods, than whom they
inhabit a lower region, so they are superior to men, than whom they
inhabit a loftier one. For they have immortality of body in
common with the gods, but passions of the mind in common with
men. On which account, say they, it is not wonderful that they
are delighted with the obscenities of the theatre, and the fictions
of the poets, since they are also subject to human passions, from
which the gods are far removed, and to which they are altogether
strangers. Whence we conclude that it was not the gods, who are
all good and highly exalted, that Plato deprived of the pleasure of
theatric plays, by reprobating and prohibiting the fictions of the
poets, but the demons.
Of these things many have
written: among others Apuleius, the Platonist of Madaura, who
composed a whole work on the subject, entitled,
Concerning the
God of Socrates
. He there discusses and explains of what kind
that deity was who attended on Socrates, a sort of familiar, by
whom it is said he was admon
ished to desist from any action
which would not turn out to his advantage. He asserts most
distinctly, and proves at great length, that it was not a god but a
demon; and he discusses with great diligence the opinion of Plato
concerning the lofty estate of the gods, the lowly estate of men,
and the middle estate of demons. These things being so, how did
Plato dare to take away, if not from the gods, whom he removed from
all human contagion, certainly from the demons, all the pleasures
of the theatre, by expelling the poets from the state? Evidently
in this way he wished to admonish the human soul, although still
confined in these moribund members, to despise the shameful
commands of the demons, and to detest their impurity, and to choose
rather the splendor of virtue. But if Plato showed himself
virtuous in answering and prohibiting these things, then certainly
it was shameful of the demons to command them. Therefore either
Apuleius is wrong, and Socrates’ familiar did not belong to this
class of deities, or Plato held contradictory opinions, now
honoring the demons, now removing from the well-regulated state the
things in which they delighted, or Socrates is not to be
congratulated on the friendship of the demon, of which Apuleius was
so ashamed that he entitled his book
On the God of Socrates
,
whilst according to the tenor of his discussion, wherein he so
diligently and at such length distinguishes gods from demons, he
ought not to have entitled it,
Concerning the God
, but
Concerning the Demon of Socrates
. But he preferred to put
this into the discussion itself rather than into the title of his
book. For, through the sound doctrine which has illuminated human
society, all, or almost all men have such a horror at the name of
demons, that every one who before reading the dissertation of
Apuleius, which sets forth the dignity of demons, should have read
the title of the book,
On the Demon of Socrates
, would
certainly have thought that the author was not a sane man. But
what did even Apuleius find to praise in the demons, except
subtlety and strength of body and a higher place of habitation?
For when he spoke generally concerning their manners, he said
nothing that was good, but very much that was bad. Finally, no
one, when he has read that book, wonders that they desired to have
even the obscenity of the stage among divine things, or that,
wishing to be thought gods, they should be delighted with the
crimes of the gods, or that all those sacred solemnities, whose
obscenity occasions laughter, and whose shameful cruelty causes
horror, should be in agreement with their passions.