τῃ ἔξωθεν
φιλοσοφί&
139·. Eunomius, in this accusation, must
have been thinking, in the θέσει and
φύσει controversy on the origin of language, of Democritus, who
called words “statues in sound,” i.e. ascribed to
them a certain amount of artificiality. But it is doubtful whether the
opinion of the purely human origin of language can be ascribed to him,
when we consider another expression of his, that “words were
statues in sound, but statues not made by the hands of men, but by the
gods themselves.” Language with him was conventional, but it was
not arbitrary. Again, Plato defines a word, an imitation in sound of
that which it imitates (Cratylus, 423 B), and Aristotle calls words
imitations (Rhet. iii. 1). But both of them were very far indeed from
tracing language back to mere onamatopœia, i.e. ascribing
it to θέσις (agreement), as opposed to φύσις in the
sense of the earlier Greek philosophy, the “essence” of the
thing named, rather than the “nature” of the names. Long
before them Pythagoras had said, “the wisest of all things is
Number, and next to Number, that which gives names.” These
oracular words do not countenance the idea that the origin of language
was purely human. Perhaps Epicurus more definitely than any taught that
in the first formation of language men acted unconsciously, moved by
nature (in the modern sense), and that then as a second stage there was
an agreement or understanding to use a certain sound for a certain
conception. Against this Heraclitus (b.c. 503)
had taught that words exist φύσει.
“Words are like the shadows of things, like the pictures of trees
and mountains reflected in the river, like our own images when we look
into a mirror.” We know at all events here what he did not
mean, viz., that man imposed what names he pleased on the objects round
him. Heraclitus’ “nature” is a very different thing
from the Darwinian Nature; it is the inherent fitness between the
object and name. Eunomius, then, was hardly justified in calling the
Greek philosophy, as a whole, atheistical in this matter, and
“against Providence.” This φύσις, the
impalpable force in the things named, could still be represented as the
will of the Deity. Eunomius outdoes Origen even, or any Christian
writer, in contending for the sacredness of names. He makes the Deity
the name-giver, but with the sole object of deifying his
“Ungenerate.” Perhaps Basil’s teaching of the human
faculty of ᾽Επίνοια
working under God as the name-giver is the truest
statement of all, and harmonizes most with modern thought.