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Chapter 9.—Concerning the Foreknowledge of God and the Free Will of Man, in Op- position to the Definition of Cicero. The manner in which Cicero addresses himself to the task of refuting the Stoics, shows that he did not think he could effect anything against them in argument unless he had first demolished divination.194  And this he attempts to accomplish by denying that there is any knowledge of future things, and maintains with all his might that there is no such knowledge either in God or man, and that there is no prediction of events.  Thus he both denies the foreknowledge of God, and attempts by vain arguments, and by opposing to himself certain oracles very easy to be refuted, to overthrow all prophecy, even such as is clearer than the light (though even these oracles are not refuted by him). But, in refuting these conjectures of the mathematicians, his argument is triumphant, because truly these are such as destroy and refute themselves.  Nevertheless, they are far more tolerable who assert the fatal influence of the stars than they who deny the foreknow- ledge of future events.  For, to confess that God exists, and at the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge of future things, is the most manifest folly.  This Cicero himself saw, and therefore attempted to assert the doctrine embodied in the words of Scripture, “The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.”195  That, however, he did not do in his own person, for he saw how odious and offensive such an opinion would be; and therefore, in his book on the nature of the gods,196 he makes Cotta dispute concerning this against the Stoics, and preferred to give his own opinion in favor of Lucilius Balbus, to whom he assigned the defence of the Stoical position, rather than in favor of Cotta, who maintained that no divinity exists.  However, in his book on divination, he in his own person most openly opposes the doctrine of the prescience of future things.  But all this he seems to do in order that he may not grant the doctrine of fate, and by so doing destroy free will.  For he thinks that, the knowledge of future things being once conceded, fate follows as so necessary a consequence that it cannot be denied. But, let these perplexing debatings and disputations of the philosophers go on as they may, we, in order that we may confess the most high and true God Himself, do confess His will, supreme power, and prescience.  Neither let us be afraid lest, after all, we do not do by will that which we do by will, because He, whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew that we would do it.  It was this which Cicero was afraid of, and therefore opposed foreknowledge.  The Stoics also maintained that all things do not come to pass by necessity, although they contended that all things happen according to destiny.  What is it, then, that Cicero feared in the prescience of future things?  Doubtless it was this,—that if all future things have been 194 De Divinat.ii. 195 Ps. xiv. 1. 196 Book iii. Concerning the Foreknowledge of God and the Free Will of Man, in Opposition to the Definition of Cicero. 222 Concerning the Foreknowledge of God and the Free Will of Man, in Opposition…

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