ition, should be more disposed than another to have his heart moved with benevolent affec-
tion to particular persons, with whom he is acquainted and conversant, and from whom
arise the greatest and most frequent occasions for exciting his benevolent temper. But my
meaning is, that no affections towards particular persons or beings are of the nature of true
virtue, but such as arise from a generally benevolent temper, or from that habit or frame of
mind, wherein consists a disposition to love being in general.
And perhaps it is needless for me to give notice to my readers, that when I speak of an
intelligent being having a heart united and benevolently disposed to being in general, I
thereby mean intelligent being in general. Not inanimate things, or beings that have no
perception or will; which are not properly capable objects of benevolence.
Love is commonly distinguished into love of benevolence, and love of complacence.
Love of benevolence is that affection or propensity of the heart to any being, which causes
it to incline to its well-being, or disposes it to desire and take pleasure in its happiness. And
if I mistake not, it is agreeable to the common opinion, that beauty in the object is always
the ground of this propensity; but that there may be a disposition to the welfare of those
that are not considered as beautiful, unless mere existence be accounted a beauty. And be-
nevolence or goodness in the Divine Being is generally supposed, not only to be prior to the
beauty of many of its objects, but to their existence; so as to be the ground both of their ex-
istence and their beauty, rather than the foundation of God’s benevolence; as it is supposed
that it is God’s goodness which moved him to give them both being and beauty. So that if
all virtue primarily consists in that affection of heart to being, which is exercised in benevol-
ence, or an inclination to its good, then God’s virtue is so extended as to include a propensity
not only to being actually existing, and actually beautiful, but to possible being, so as to incline
him to give a being beauty and happiness.
What is commonly called love of complacence, presupposes beauty. For it is no other
than delight in beauty; or complacence in the person or being beloved for his beauty. If
virtue be the beauty of an intelligent being, and virtue consists in love, then it is plain incon-
sistence, to suppose that virtue primarily consists in any love to its object for its beauty;
either in a love of complacence, which is delight in a being for its beauty, or in a love of be-
nevolence, that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. For that would be to suppose,
that the beauty of intelligent beings primarily consists in love to beauty; or that their virtue
first of all consists in their love to virtue. Which is an inconsistence, and going in a circle.
Because it makes virtue, or beauty of mind, the foundation or first motive of that love wherein
virtue originally consists, or wherein the very first virtue consists; or, it supposes the first
virtue to be the consequence and effect of virtue. Which makes the first virtue both the
ground and the consequence, both cause and effect of itself. Doubtless virtue primarily
consists in something else besides any effect or consequence of virtue. If virtue consists
primarily in love to virtue, then virtue, the thing loved, is the love of virtue: so that virtue
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CHAPTER I. Concerning the essence of true virtue.