It may seem to many useless to
linger over what is so obvious, and to attempt a discussion of that
which to them is on the face of it false and abominable and groundless:
nevertheless, to avoid even the appearance of having to let these
statements pass for want of counter-arguments, we will meet them with
all our might. He says, “each being amongst them is unmixed,
single, and absolutely one, as estimated by its dignity, both in fact
and in conception.” Then premising this very doubtful statement
as an axiom and valuing his own ‘ipse dixit’ as a
sufficient substitute for any proof, he thinks he has made a point.
“There are three Beings:” for he implies this when he says,
‘each being amongst them:’ he would not have used these
words, if he meant only one. Now if he speaks thus of the mutual
difference between the Beings in order to avoid complicity with the
heresy of Sabellius, who applied three titles to one subject, we would
acquiesce in his statement: nor would any of the Faithful contradict
his view, except so far as he seems to be at fault in his names, and
his mere form of expression in speaking of ‘beings’ instead
of ‘persons:’ for things that are identical on the score of
being will not all agree equally in definition on the score of
personality. For instance, Peter, James, and John are the same viewed
as beings, each was a man: but in the characteristics of their
respective personalities, they were not alike. If, then, he were only
proving that it is not right to confound the Persons, and to fit all
the three names on to one Subject, his ‘saying’ would be,
to use the Apostle’s words, ‘faithful, and worthy of all
acceptation 1 Timothy i.
15..’ But this is not his object: he
speaks so, not because he divides the Persons only from each other by
their recognized characteristics, but because he makes the actual
substantial being of each different from that of the others, or rather
from itself: and so he speaks of a plurality of beings with distinctive
differences which alienate them from each other. I therefore declare
that his view is unfounded, and lacks a principle: it starts from data
that are not granted, and then it constructs by mere logic a blasphemy
upon them. It attempts no demonstration that could attract towards such a
conception of the doctrine: it merely contains the statement of an
unproved impiety, as if it were telling us a dream. While the Church
teaches that we must not divide our faith amongst a plurality of
beings, but must recognize no difference of being in three Subjects or
Persons, whereas our opponents posit a variety and unlikeness amongst
them as Beings, this writer confidently assumes as already proved what
never has been, and never can be, proved by argument: maybe he has not
even yet found hearers for his talk: or he might have been informed by
one of them who was listening intelligently that every statement which
is made at random, and without proof, is ‘an old woman’s
tale,’ and powerless to prove the question, in itself, unaided by
any plea whatever fetched from the Scriptures, or from human
reasonings. So much for this.