Afterwards, however, he gives
his discourse a more moderate turn, imparting to it even a touch of
gentleness, and, though he had but a little earlier partitioned off the
Son from the title of Existent, he now says,—“We affirm
that the Son is not only existent, and above all existent things, but
we also call Him Lord and God, the Maker of every being οὐσίας, sensible and intelligible.” What does
he suppose this “being” to be? created? or uncreated? For
if he confesses Jesus to be Lord, God, and Maker of all intelligible
being, it necessarily follows, if he says it is uncreated, that
he speaks falsely, ascribing to the Son the making of the uncreated
Nature. But if he believes it to be created, he makes Him His
own Maker. For if the act of creation be not separated from
intelligible nature in favour of Him Who is independent and uncreated,
there will no longer remain any mark of distinction, as the sensible
creation and the intelligible being will be thought of under one head The
passage is a little obscure: if the force of the dative τῷ καθ᾽
ἑαυτὸν
ἀκτίστῳ be that assigned to it, the meaning will be that, if no exception
is made in the statement that the Son is the Maker of every
intelligible being, the Deity will be included among the works of the
Son, Who will thus be the Maker of Himself, as of the sensible
creation.. But here he brings in the assertion that
“in the creation of existent things He has been entrusted by the
Father with the construction of all things visible and invisible, and
with the providential care over all that comes into being, inasmuch as
the power allotted to Him from above is sufficient for the production
of those things which have been constructed It is
not quite clear how much of this is citation, and how much paraphrase
of Eunomius’ words..” The vast length to which our
treatise has run compels us to pass over these assertions briefly: but,
in a sense, profanity surrounds the argument, containing a vast swarm
of notions like venomous wasps. “He was entrusted,” he
says, “with the construction of things by the Father.” But
if he had been talking about some artizan executing his work at the
pleasure of his employer, would he not have used the same language? For
we are not wrong in saying just the same of Bezaleel, that being
entrusted by Moses with the building of the tabernacle, he became the
constructor of those things there The
reference is to Exod. xxxv. 30. mentioned, and
would not have taken the work in hand had he not previously acquired
his knowledge by Divine inspiration, and ventured upon the undertaking
on Moses’ entrusting him with its execution. Accordingly the term
“entrusted” suggests that His office and power in creation
came to Him as something adventitious, in the sense that before He was
entrusted with that commission He had neither the will nor the power to
act, but when He received authority to execute the works, and power
sufficient for the works, then He became the artificer of things
that are, the power allotted to Him from on high being, as Eunomius
says, sufficient for the purpose. Does he then place even the
generation of the Son, by some astrological juggling Reading τερατείαν
for the otherwise unknown word περατείαν, which Oehler retains. If περατείαν
is the true reading, it should probably be rendered by
“fatalism,” or “determination.” Gulonius
renders it by “determinationem.” It may be connected with
the name “Peratae,” given to one of the Ophite sects, who
held fatalist views., under some destiny, just as they who
practise this vain deceit affirm that the appointment of their lot in
life comes to men at the time of their birth, by such and such
conjunctions or oppositions of the stars, as the rotation above moves
on in a kind of ordered train, assigning to those who are coming into
being their special faculties? It may be that something of this kind is
in the mind of our sage, and he says that to Him that is above all
rule, and authority, and dominion, and above every name that is named,
not only in this world, but also in that which is to come, there has
been allotted, as though He were pent in some hollow spaces, power from
on high, measured out in accordance with the quantity of things which
come into being. I will pass over this part of his treatise also
summarily, letting fall from a slight commencement of investigation,
for the more intelligent sort of readers, seeds to enable them to
discern his profanity. Moreover, in what follows, there is ready
written a kind of apology for ourselves. For we cannot any longer be
thought to be missing the intention of his discourse, and
misinterpreting his words to render them subject to criticism, when his
own voice acknowledges the absurdity of his doctrine. His words stand
as follows:—“What? did not earth and angel come into being,
when before they were not?” See how our lofty theologian is not
ashamed to apply the same description to earth and angels and to the
Maker of all! Surely if he thinks it fit to predicate the same of earth
and its Lord, he must either make a god of the one, or degrade the
other to a level with it.