excommunication) incur the penalty of being “taken away” from the Church. And accord-
ingly, in so far as it was meantime possible for him to be “taken away,” he “adjudged such
an one to be surrendered to Satan for the destruction of the flesh.” For it followed that flesh
which was being cast forth to the devil should be accursed, in order that it might be discarded
from the sacrament of blessing, never to return into the camp of the Church.
And thus we see in this place the apostle’s severity divided, against one who was “in-
flated,” and one who was “incestuous:” (we see the apostle) armed against the one with “a
rod,” against the other with a sentence,—a “rod,” which he was threatening; a sentence,
which he was executing: the former (we see) still brandishing, the latter instantaneously
hurtling; (the one) wherewith he was rebuking, and (the other) wherewith he was con-
demning. And certain it is, that forthwith thereafter the rebuked one indeed trembled be-
neath the menace of the uplifted rod, but the condemned perished under the instant infliction
of the penalty. Immediately the former retreated fearing the blow, the latter paying the
penalty. When a letter of the self-same apostle is sent a second time to the Corinthians,
pardon is granted plainly; but it is uncertain to whom, because neither person nor cause is
advertised. I will compare the cases with the senses. If the “incestuous” man is set before
us, on the same platform will be the “inflated” man too. Surely the analogy of the case is
sufficiently maintained, when the “inflated” is rebuked, but the “incestuous” is condemned.
To the “inflated” pardon is granted, but after rebuke; to the “incestuous” no pardon seems
to have been granted, as under condemnation. If it was to him for whom it was feared that
he might be “devoured by mourning” that pardon was being granted, the “rebuked” one
was still in danger of being devoured, losing heart on account of the commination, and
mourning on account of the rebuke. The “condemned” one, however, was permanently
accounted as already devoured, alike by his fault and by his sentence; (accounted, that is,
as one) who had not to “mourn,” but to suffer that which, before suffering it, he might have
mourned. If the reason why pardon was being granted was “lest we should be defrauded
by Satan,” the loss against which precaution was being taken had to do with that which had
not yet perished. No precaution is taken in the use of a thing finally despatched, but in the
case of a thing still safe. But the condemned one—condemned, too, to the possession of
Satan—had already perished from the Church at the moment when he had committed such
a deed, not to say withal at the moment of being forsworn by the Church itself. How should
(the Church) fear to suffer a fraudulent loss of him whom she had already lost on his ereption,
and whom, after condemnation, she could not have held? Lastly, to what will it be becoming
for a judge to grant indulgence? to that which by a formal pronouncement he has decisively
settled, or to that which by an interlocutory sentence he has left in suspense? And, of course,
(I am speaking of) that judge who is not wont “to rebuild those things which he has destroyed,
lest he be held a transgressor.” 849
849 Comp. Gal. ii. 18.
201
The Same Subject Continued.