The above account of the anti-Arian test
formulated at Nicæa will suffice to explain the motives for its
adoption, the difficulties which made that adoption reluctant, and the
fact of the reaction which followed. One thing is clear, namely that
given the actual conditions, nothing short of the test adopted would
have availed to exclude the Arian doctrine. It is also I think clear,
that not only was the current theology of the Eastern Church unable to
cope with Arianism, but that it was itself a danger to the Church and
in need of the corrective check of the Nicene definition. Hellenic as
was the system of Origen, it was in its spirit Christian, and saturated
with the influence of Scripture. It could never have taken its place as
the expression of the whole mind of the Church; but it remains as the
noblest monument of a Christian intellect resolutely in love with truth
for its own sake, and bent upon claiming for Christ the whole range of
the legitimate activity of the human spirit. But the age had inherited
only the wreck of Origenism, and its partial victory in the Church had
brought confusion in its train, the leaders of the Church were
characterised by secular knowledge rather than grasp of first
principles, by dogmatic intellectualism rather than central
apprehension of God in Christ. Eusebius of Cæsarea is their
typical representative. The Nicene definition and the work of
Athanasius which followed were a summons back to the simple first
principles of the Gospel and the Rule of Faith. What then is their
value to ourselves? Above all, this, that they have preserved to us
what Arianism would have destroyed, that assurance of Knowledge of, and
Reconciliation to, God in Christ of which the divinity of the Saviour
is the indispensable condition; if we are now Christians in the sense
of S. Paul we owe it under God to the work of the great synod. Not that
the synod explained all; or did more than effectually ‘block off
false forms of thought or avenues of unbalanced inference’ which
‘challenged the acceptance of Christian people.’ The
decisions of councils are ‘primarily not the Church saying
“yes” to fresh truths or developments or forms of
consciousness; but rather saying “no” to untrue and
misleading modes of shaping and stating her truth,’ (Lux
Mundi, ed. i. p. 240, cf. p. 334). It is objected that the Nicene
Formula, especially as understood by Athanasius, is itself a
‘false form of thought,’ a flat contradiction in terms.
That the latter is true we do not dispute (see Newman’s notes
infra, p. 336, note 1, &c.). But before pronouncing the form
of thought for that reason a false one, we must consider what the
‘terms’ are, and to what they are applied. To myself it
appears that a religion which brought the divine existence into the
compass of the categories of any philosophy would by that very fact
forfeit its claim to the character of revelation. The categories of
human thought are the outcome of organised experience of a sensible
world, and beyond the limits of that world they fail us. This is true
quite apart from revelation. The ideas of essence and substance,
personality and will, separateness and continuity, cause and effect,
unity and plurality, are all in different degrees helps which the mind
uses in order to arrange its knowledge, and valid within the range of
experience, but which become a danger when invested with absolute
validity as things in themselves. Even the mathematician reaches real
results by operating with terms which contain a perfect contradiction
(e.g. ·, and to some extent the
‘calculus of operations’). The idea of Will in man, of
Personality in God, present difficulties which reason cannot
reconcile.