the number, and so make ninety-six sects. Then, lastly, as each of these sects may be adhered
to either by men who love a life of ease, as those who have through choice or necessity ad-
dicted themselves to study, or by men who love a busy life, as those who, while philosophiz-
ing, have been much occupied with state affairs and public business, or by men who choose
a mixed life, in imitation of those who have apportioned their time partly to erudite leisure,
partly to necessary business: by these differences the number of the sects is tripled, and
becomes 288.
I have thus, as briefly and lucidly as I could, given in my own words the opinions which
Varro expresses in his book. But how he refutes all the rest of these sects, and chooses one,
the Old Academy, instituted by Plato, and continuing to Polemo, the fourth teacher of that
school of philosophy which held that their system was certain; and how on this ground he
distinguishes it from the New Academy,1262 which began with Polemo’s successor Arcesilaus,
and held that all things are uncertain; and how he seeks to establish that the Old Academy
was as free from error as from doubt,—all this, I say, were too long to enter upon in detail,
and yet I must not altogether pass it by in silence. Varro then rejects, as a first step, all those
differences which have multiplied the number of sects; and the ground on which he does
so is that they are not differences about the supreme good. He maintains that in philosophy
a sect is created only by its having an opinion of its own different from other schools on the
point of the ends-in-chief. For man has no other reason for philosophizing than that he
may be happy; but that which makes him happy is itself the supreme good. In other words,
the supreme good is the reason of philosophizing; and therefore that cannot be called a sect
of philosophy which pursues no way of its own towards the supreme good. Thus, when it
399
is asked whether a wise man will adopt the social life, and desire and be interested in the
supreme good of his friend as in his own, or will, on the contrary, do all that he does merely
for his own sake, there is no question here about the supreme good, but only about the
propriety of associating or not associating a friend in its participation: whether the wise
man will do this not for his own sake, but for the sake of his friend in whose good he delights
as in his own. So, too, when it is asked whether all things about which philosophy is con-
cerned are to be considered uncertain, as by the New Academy, or certain, as the other
philosophers maintain, the question here is not what end should be pursued, but whether
or not we are to believe in the substantial existence of that end; or, to put it more plainly,
whether he who pursues the supreme good must maintain that it is a true good, or only that
it appears to him to be true, though possibly it may be delusive,—both pursuing one and
the same good. The distinction, too, which is founded on the dress and manners of the
Cynics, does not touch the question of the chief good, but only the question whether he
who pursues that good which seems to himself true should live as do the Cynics. There
1262 Frequently called the Middle Academy; the New beginning with Carneades.
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That Varro Has Made Out that Two Hundred and Eighty-Eight Different Sects…