evil a proof that it never inclines to what is good—so the bias of conception towards what
is vain and unprofitable does not prove its inability for what is profitable, but, on the contrary,
is a demonstration of its not being unserviceable for what is beneficial and necessary to the
mind. For as, in the one case, it discovers means to produce pleasure or terror, so, in the
other, it does not fail to find ways for getting at truth. Now one of the objects of inquiry was
whether the First Cause, viz. God, exists without beginning, or whether His existence is de-
pendent on some beginning. But perceiving, by the aid of thought, that that cannot be a
First Cause which we conceive of as the consequence of another, we devised a word expressive
of such a notion, and we say that He who is without anterior cause exists without origin,
or, so to say, ungenerately. And Him Who so exists we call ungenerate and without origin,
indicating, by that appellation, not what He is, but what He is not.
But as far as possible to elucidate the idea, I will endeavour to illustrate it by a still
plainer example. Let us suppose the inquiry to be about some tree, whether it is cultivated
or wild. If the former, we call it planted, if the latter, not planted. And such a term exactly
hits the truth, for the tree must needs be after this manner or that. And yet the word does
not indicate the peculiar nature of the plant. From the term “not-planted” we learn that it
is of spontaneous growth; but whether what is thus signified is a plane, or a vine, or some
other such plant, the name applied to it does not inform us.
This example being understood, it is time to go on to the thing which it illustrates. This
much we comprehend, that the First Cause has His existence from no antecedent one. Ac-
cordingly, we call God ungenerate as existing ungenerately, reducing this notion of ungen-
eracy into verbal form. That He is without origin or beginning we show by the force of the
term. But what that Being is which exists ungenerately, this appellation does not lead us to
discern. Nor was it to be supposed that the processes of conception could avail to raise us
above the limits of our nature, and open up the incomprehensible to our view, and enable
us to compass the knowledge of that which no knowledge can approach1102. Nevertheless,
our adversary storms at our Master, and tries to tear to pieces his teaching respecting the
faculty of thought and conception, and derides what has been said, revelling as usual in the
rattle of his jingling phraseology, and saying that he (Basil) shrinks from adducing evidence
1102 Cf. Origen c. Celsum, vi. 65. Celsus had said, “God cannot be named.” “This requires a distinction to
be made. If Celsus means that there is nothing in the signification of words that can express the qualities of God,
what he says is true, seeing that there are many other qualities that cannot be named. Who, for instance, can
express in words the difference of quality between the sweetness of a date and that of a fig? Peculiar individual
qualities cannot be expressed in a word. No wonder, then, that in this absolute sense God cannot be named. But
if by ‘name’ we only mean the possible expression of some one thing about God, by way of leading on the
listener, and producing in him such a notion about God as human faculties can reach to, then there is nothing
strange in saying, that God can have a name.”
509
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.