SECT. V.
Concerning the notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency.
The plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and Liberty, in common speech,
is The power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleases. Or in other
words, his being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in
any respect. as he wills. 108 —And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we call that by,
is a person’s being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do
otherwise.
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If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the word Liberty, in the ordinary use
of language; as I trust that none that has ever learned to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny;
then it will follow, that in propriety of speech, neither Liberty, nor its contrary, can properly
be ascribed to any being or thing, but that which has such a faculty, power or property, as
is called Will. For that which is possessed of no will, cannot have any power or opportunity
of doing according to its will, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be restrained
from acting agreeably to it. And therefore to talk of Liberty, or the contrary, as belonging
to the very Will itself, is not to speak good sense; if we judge of sense, and nonsense, by the
original and proper signification of words.—For the Will itself is not an Agent that has a
will: the power of choosing, itself, has not a power of choosing. That which has the power
of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the
Liberty of doing according to his will, is the Agent who is possessed of the Will; and not the
Will which he is possessed of. We say with propriety, that a bird let loose has power and
liberty to fly; but not that the bird’s power of flying has a power arid Liberty of flying. To
be free is the property of an Agent, who is possessed of powers and faculties, as much as to
be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But these qualities are the properties of persons;
and not the properties of properties.
There are two things contrary to what is called Liberty in common speech. One is con-
straint; otherwise called force, compulsion, and coaction; which is a person’s being necessitated
to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is restraint; which is, his being hindered, and
not having power to do according to his will. But that which has no will, cannot be the subject
of these things.—I need say the less on this head, Mr. Locke having set the same thing forth,
with so great clearness, in his Essay on the Human Understanding.
But one thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly called Liberty; namely,
that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice,
is all that is meant by it; without taking into the meaning of the word, any thing of the cause
108 I say not only doing, but conducting; because a voluntary forebearing to do, sitting still, keeping silence,
&c. are instances of persons’ conduct, about which Liberty is exercised; though they are not so properly called
doing.
SECTION V. Concerning the notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency.
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SECTION V. Concerning the notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency.