Indeed, if we are to speak the
truth boldly, without any reserve, Manes, who for having been the
first, they say, to venture to entertain the Manichæan view, gave
his name to that heresy, may fairly be considered the less offensive of
the two. I say this, just as if one had to choose between a viper and
an asp for the most affection towards man; still, if we consider, there
is some difference between brutes πλὴν ἀλλ᾽
ἐπειδή ἐστι
καὶ ἐν
θηριοις
κρίοις.. Does
not a comparison of doctrines show that those older heretics are less
intolerable than these? Manes thought he was pleading on the side of
the Origin of Good, when he represented that Evil could derive thence
none of its causes; so he linked the chain of things which are on the
list of the bad to a separate Principle, in his character of the
Almighty’s champion, and in his pious aversion to put the blame
of any unjustifiable aberrations upon that Source of Good; not
perceiving, with his narrow understanding, that it is impossible even
to conceive of God as the fashioner of evil, or on the other hand, of
any other First Principle besides Him. There might be a long discussion
on this point, but it is beside our present purpose. We mentioned
Manes’ statements only in order to show, that he at all events
thought it his duty to separate evil from anything to do with God. But
the blasphemous error with regard to the Son, which these men
systematize, is much more terrible. Like the others, they explain the
existence of evil by a contrariety in respect of Being; but when they
declare, besides this, that the God of the universe is actually the
Maker of this alien production, and say that this
“generation” formed by Him into a substance possesses a
nature foreign to that of its Maker, they exhibit therein more of
impiety than the aforesaid sect; for they not only give a personal
existence to that which in its nature is opposed to good, but they say
that a Good Deity is the Cause of another Deity who in nature diverges
from His; and they all but openly exclaim in their teaching, that there
is in existence something opposite to the nature of the good, deriving
its personality from the good itself. For when we know the
Father’s substance to be good, and therefore find that the
Son’s substance, owing to its being unlike the Father’s in
its nature (which is the tenet of this heresy), is amongst the contrary
predicables, what is thereby proved? Why, not only that the opposite to
the good subsists, but that this contrary comes from the good itself. I
declare this to be more horrible even than the irrationality of the
Manichees.