441
within us; everything except the faculty of reason and thought. That alone, the choice product,
as has been said, of all our life, bears the stamp of the Divine character. But since, according
to the view which we have just enunciated, it is not possible for this reasoning faculty to
exist in the life of the body without existing by means of sensations, and since sensation is
already found subsisting in the brute creation, necessarily as it were, by reason of this one
condition, our soul has touch with the other things which are knit up with it1800; and these
are all those phænomena within us that we call “passions”; which have not been allotted to
human nature for any bad purpose at all (for the Creator would most certainly be the author
of evil, if in them, so deeply rooted as they are in our nature, any necessities of wrong-doing
were found), but according to the use which our free will puts them to, these emotions of
the soul become the instruments of virtue or of vice. They are like the iron which is being
fashioned according to the volition of the artificer, and receives whatever shape the idea
which is in his mind prescribes, and becomes a sword or some agricultural implement.
Supposing, then, that our reason, which is our nature’s choicest part, holds the dominion
over these imported emotions (as Scripture allegorically declares in the command to men
to rule over the brutes), none of them will be active in the ministry of evil; fear will only
generate within us obedience1801, and anger fortitude, and cowardice caution; and the instinct
of desire will procure for us the delight that is Divine and perfect. But if reason drops the
reins and is dragged behind like a charioteer who has got entangled in his car, then these
instincts are changed into fierceness, just as we see happens amongst the brutes. For since
reason does not preside over the natural impulses that are implanted1802 in them, the more
irascible animals, under the generalship of their anger, mutually destroy each other; while
the bulky and powerful animals get no good themselves from their strength, but become by
their want of reason slaves of that which has reason. Neither are the activities of their desire
for pleasure employed on any of the higher objects; nor does any other instinct to be observed
in them result in any profit to themselves. Thus too, with ourselves, if these instincts are
not turned by reasoning into the right direction, and if our feelings get the mastery of our
mind, the man is changed from a reasoning into an unreasoning being, and from godlike
intelligence sinks by the force of these passions to the level of the brute.
1800 Reading διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς τὰ συνημμένα τούτῳ (for τούτων), with Sifanus.
1801 Cf. De Hom. Opif. c. xviii. 5. “So, on the contrary, if reason instead assumes sway over such emotions,
each of them is transmuted to a form of virtue: for anger produces courage; terror, caution; fear, obedience;
hatred, aversion from vice; the power of love, the desire for what is truly beautiful, &c.” Just below, the allusion
is to Plato’s charioteer, Phædrus, p. 253 C, and the old custom of having the reins round the driver’s waist is to
be noticed.
1802 are implanted. All the Codd. have ἐγκειμένης here, instead of the ἐγκωμιαζομένης of the Paris Edition,
which must be meant for ἐγκωμαζομένης (itself a vox nihili), “run riot in them.”
821
On the Soul and the Resurrection.