Chapter 34.—Nature Cannot Be Without Some Good. The Manichæans Dwell Upon
the Evils.
37. But perhaps you will say that these evils cannot be removed from the natures, and
must therefore be considered natural. The question at present is not what can be taken
away, and what cannot; but it certainly helps to a clear perception that these natures, as far
as they are natures, are good, when we see that the good things can be thought of without
these evil things, while without these good things no nature can be conceived of. I can
conceive of waters without muddy commotion; but without settled continuity of parts no
material form is an object of thought or of sensation in any way. Therefore even these
muddy waters could not exist without the good which was the condition of their material
existence. As to the reply that these evil things cannot be taken from such natures, I rejoin
that neither can the good things be taken away. Why, then, should you call these things
natural evils, on account of the evil things which you suppose cannot be taken away, and
yet refuse to call them natural good things, on account of the good things which, as has been
proved, cannot be taken away?
38. You may next ask, as you usually do for a last resource, whence come these evils
which I have said that I too disapprove of. I shall perhaps tell you, if you first tell me whence
are those good things which you too are obliged to commend, if you would not be altogether
unreasonable. But why should I ask this, when we both acknowledge that all good things
whatever, and how great soever, are from the one God, who is supremely good? You must
therefore yourselves oppose Manichæus who has placed all these important good things
which we have mentioned and justly commended,—the continuity and agreement of parts
in each nature, the health and vigor of the animated creatures, and the other things which
it would be wearisome to repeat,—(in an imaginary region of darkness, so as to separate
them altogether from that God whom he allows to be the author of all good things.) He lost
sight of those good things, while taking notice only of what was disagreeable; as if one,
frightened by a lion’s roaring, and seeing him dragging away and tearing the bodies of cattle
or human beings which he had seized, should from childish pusillanimity be so overpowered
with fear as to see nothing but the cruelty and ferocity of the lion; and overlooking or dis-
regarding all the other qualities, should exclaim against the nature of this animal as not only
evil, but a great evil, his fear adding to his vehemence. But were he to see a tame lion, with
its ferocity subdued, especially if he had never been frightened by a lion, he would have
leisure, in the absence of danger and terror, to observe and admire the beauty of the animal.
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My only remark on this is one closely connected with our subject: that any nature may be
in some case disagreeable, so as to excite hatred towards the whole nature; though it is clear
that the form of a real living beast, even when it excites terror in the woods, is far better than
that of the artificial imitation which is commended in a painting on the wall. We must not
then be misled into this error by Manichæus, or be hindered from observing the forms of
Nature Cannot Be Without Some Good. The Manichæans Dwell Upon the Evils.
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Nature Cannot Be Without Some Good. The Manichæans Dwell Upon the Evil…