very much from this natural tendency in the state of things, and but little from a good in-
clination; then it is a dictate of common Sense, that there is so much the less virtue in what
is done; and so it is less praiseworthy and rewardable. The reason is easy, viz. because such
a natural propensity or tendency is an approach to natural necessity; and the greater the
propensity, still so much the nearer is the approach to necessity. And, therefore, as natural
necessity takes away or shuts out all virtue, so this propensity approaches to an abolition of
virtue; that is, it diminishes it. And, on the other hand, natural difficulty, in the state of
things, is an approach to natural impossibility. And as the latter, when it is complete and
absolute, wholly takes away Blame; so such difficulty takes away some Blame, or diminishes
Blame; and makes the thing done to be less worthy of punishment.
II. Men, in their first use of such phrases as these, must, cannot, cannot help it, cannot
avoid it, necessary, unable, impossible, unavoidable, irresistible, &c., use them to signify a
necessity of constraint or restraint, a natural necessity or impossibility; or some necessity
that the Will has nothing to do in; which may be, whether men will or no; and which may
be supposed to be just the same, let men’s inclinations and desires be what they will. Such
kind of terms, in their original use, I suppose among all nations, are relative; carrying in
their signification (as was before observed) a reference or respect to some contrary Will,
desire, or endeavour, which, it is supposed, is, or may be, in the case. All men find, and begin
to find in early childhood, that there are innumerable things that cannot be done, which
they desire to do; and innumerable things, which they are averse to, that must be, they
cannot avoid them, they will be, whether they choose them or no. It is to express this neces-
sity, which men so soon and so often find, and which so greatly and early affects them in
innumerable cases, that such terms and phrases are first formed; and it is to signify such a
necessity, that they are first used, and that they are most constantly used, in the common
affairs of life; and not to signify any such metaphysical, speculative, and abstract notion, as
that connexion in the nature or course of things, which is between the subject and predicative
of a proposition, and which is the foundation of the certain truth of that proposition; to
64
signify which, they who employ themselves in philosophical inquiries into the first origin
and metaphysical relations and dependencies of things, have borrowed these terms, for want
of others. But we grow up from our cradles in a use of such terms and phrases entirely dif-
ferent from this, and carrying a sense exceeding diverse from that in which they are com-
monly used in the controversy between Arminians and Calvinists. And it being, as was said
before, a dictate of the universal sense of mankind, evident to us as soon as we begin to
think, that the necessity signified by these terms, in the sense in which we first learn them,
does excuse persons, and free them from all Fault or Blame; hence our idea of excusableness
or faultlessness is tied to these terms and phrases by a strong habit, which is begun in
childhood, as soon as we begin to speak, and grows up with us, and is strengthened by
constant use and custom, the connexion growing stronger and stronger.
691
SECTION III. The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to…