the flesh which He has assumed, and at the same time
deified. “Un terme cher aux
Pères du IVe siècle, de nous
déifier” (Denis, Philosophie
d’Origène, p. 458). This θεοποίησις
or θέωσις is
more than a metaphor even from the first; “vere fideles
vocantur θεοί, non naturâ
quidem, sed τῇ
ὁμοιώσει, ait Athanasius;” Casaubon, In Epist. ad Eustath.
“We become ‘gods’ by grasping the Divine power and
substance;” Clement, Stromata, iv. That the Platonists had
thus used the word of τὸ
πρὸς μείζονα
δόξαν
ἀνυψωθὲν is clear. Synesius in one of his Hymns says to his
soul:—
“Soon commingled with the
Father
Thou shalt dance a
‘god’ with God.”
Just as elsewhere (in
Dione, p. 50) he says, “it is not sufficient not to be bad;
each must be even a ‘god.’” Cf. also Gregory Thaum.
Panegyr Origenis, §142. When we come to the Fathers of the
4th century and later, these words are used more especially of the
work of the Holy Spirit upon man. Cf. Cyrill. Alex.: “If
to be able to ‘deify’ is a greater thing than a creature
can do, and if the Spirit does ‘deify,’ how can he be
created or anything but God, seeing that he
‘deifies’?” “If the Spirit is not God,”
says Gregory Naz., “let him first be deified, and then let him
deify me his equal;” where two things are implied, 1. that the
recognized work of the Holy Spirit is to ‘deify,’ 2. that
this “deification” is not Godhead. It is “the
comparative god-making” of Dionysius Areopag. whereby we are
“partakers of the Divine nature” (2 Pet. i. 4). On the word as
applied to the human nature of our Saviour Himself, Huet
(Origeniana, ii. 3, c. 17), in discussing the statement of
Origen, in his Commentary on S. Matthew (Tract 27), that
“Christ after His resurrection ‘deified’ the human
nature which He had taken,” remarks, “If we take this word
so as to make Origen mean that the Word was changed into the human
nature, and that the flesh itself was changed into God and made of the
same substance as the Word, he will clearly be guilty of that deadly
error which Apollinaris brought into the Church (i.e. that the
Saviour’s soul is not ‘reasonable,’ nor His flesh
human); or rather of the heresy perpetrated by some sects of the
Eutychians, who asserted that the human nature was changed into the
Divine after the Resurrection. But if we take him to mean that
Christ’s human nature, after being divested of weakness after
death, assumed a certain Divine quality, we shall be doing Him
no wrong.” He then quotes a line from Gregory’s
Iambics:—
“The thing
‘deifying,’ and the thing ‘deified,’ are one
God:”
and this is said even of
Christ’s Incarnation; how much more then can it be said of His
Resurrection state, as in this passage of the Great Catechism?
Huet adds one of Origen’s answers to Celsus: “His mortal
body and the human soul in Him, by virtue of their junction or rather
union and blending with that (deity), assumed, we assert, qualities of
the very greatest kind.…What incredibility is there in the
quality of mortality in the body of Jesus changing, when God so planned
and willed it, into an ethereal and Divine” (i.e. the
matter, as the receptacle of these qualities, remaining the same)? It
is in this sense that Chrysostom can say that “Christ came to us,
and took upon Him our nature and deified it;” and Augustine,
“your humanity received the name of that deity” (contr.
Arian.).