396 ON THE TRINITY. [bOOK XV.
For who does not see his own thought ? And yet who does
see his own thought, I do not say with the eye of the flesh,
but with the inner sight itself ? Who does not see it, and
who does see it ? Since thought is a kind of sight of the
mind ; whether those things are present which are seen also
by the bodily eyes, or perceived by the other senses; or
whether they are not present, but their likenesses are dis-
cerned by thought ; or whether neither of these is the case,
but things are thought of that are neither bodily things nor
likenesses of bodily things, as the virtues and vices ; or as,
indeed, thought itself is thought of; or whether it be those
things which are the subjects of instruction and of liberal
sciences ; or whether the higher causes and reasons themselves
of all these things in the unchangeable nature are thought of
;
or whether it be even evil, and vain, and false things that we
are thinking of, with either the sense not consenting, or erring
in its consent.
Chap. x.—Concerning the icord of the mind, in which we see the Word of God,
as in a glass and an enigma.
1*7. But let us now speak of those things of which we think
as known, andhave in our knowledge even ifwe do not think of
them ; whether they belong to the contemplative knowledge,
which, as I have argued, is properly to be called wisdom, or
to the active, w^hich is properly to be called knowledge. For
both together belong to one mind, and are one image of God.
But when we treat of the lower of the two distinctly and
separately, then it is not to be called an image of God, although
even then, too, some likeness of that Trinity may be found in
it; as we showed in the thirteenth book. We speak now,
therefore, of the entire knowledge of man altogether, in which
whatever is known to us is known ; that, at any rate, which
is true ; otherwise it would not be laiown. For no one knows
what is false, except when he knows it to be false ; and if he
knows this, then he knows what is true : for it is true that
that is false. We treat, therefore, now of those things which
we think as known, and which are known to us even if they
are not being thought of. But certainly, if we would utter
them in words, we can only do so by thinking them. For
altliough there were no words spoken, at any rate, hewho thinks