Chapter
III.—Of Indulgence and Pure Volition. The Question
Illustrated.
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For what things are
manifest
we all know;
and
in what sense
these very things are manifest must be
thoroughly examined. For, albeit some things seem to savour of
“the will of God,” seeing that they are
allowed
by
Him, it does not forthwith follow that everything which is
permitted
proceeds out of the mere and absolute will of him who
permits.
Indulgence
is the source of all
permission
. And albeit indulgence is not independent of
volition, still, inasmuch as it has its
cause
in him to whom the
indulgence is granted, it comes (as it were) from
unwilling
volition, having experienced a producing cause of itself which
constrains
volition. See what is the nature of a volition
of which some second party is the cause. There is, again, a
second species of
pure
volition to be considered. God
wills us to do some acts pleasing to
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Himself, in
which it is not indulgence which patronizes, but discipline which lords
it. If, however, He has given a preference over these to some
other acts—(acts), of course, which He
more
wills—is
there a doubt that the acts which we are to pursue are those which He
more
wills; since those which He
less
wills (because He
wills others
more
) are to be similarly regarded as if He did
not
will them? For, by showing what He
more
wills,
He has effaced the lesser volition by the greater. And in as far
as He has proposed each (volition) to your knowledge, in so far has He
defined it to be your duty to pursue that which He has declared that He
more
wills. Then, if the object of His declaring has been
that you may pursue that which He
more
wills; doubtless, unless
you do so, you savour of contrariety to His volition, by savouring of
contrariety to His
superior
volition; and you rather offend than
merit reward, by doing what He wills indeed, and rejecting what He
more
wills. Partly, you sin; partly, if you sin not, still
you deserve no reward. Moreover, is not even the unwillingness to
deserve reward a sin?
If, therefore, second marriage finds the source of its
allowance in that “will of God” which is
called indulgence, we shall deny that
that which has indulgence for its cause is volition pure; if in that to
which some other—that, namely, which regards continence as more
desirable—is preferred as superior, we shall have learned (by
what has been argued above), that the not-superior is rescinded by the
superior. Suffer me to have touched upon these considerations, in
order that I may now follow the course of the apostle’s
words. But, in the first place, I shall not be thought
irreligious if I remark on what he himself professes; (namely), that he
has introduced all
indulgence
in regard to marriage from his own
(judgment)—that is, from human sense, not from divine
prescript. For, withal, when he has laid down the definitive rule
with reference to “the widowed and the unwedded,” that they
are to “marry if they cannot contain,” because
“better it is to marry than to burn,”
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he turns round to the other class, and says: “But to the
wedded I make official declaration—not indeed I, but the
Lord.” Thus he shows, by the transfer of his own
personality to the Lord, that what he had said above he had pronounced
not in the Lord’s person, but in his own: “Better it
is to marry than to burn.” Now, although that expression
pertain to such as
are “apprehended
”
by the
faith
in an unwedded or widowed condition, still, inasmuch as all
cling to it with a view to licence in the way of marrying, I should
wish to give a thorough treatment to the inquiry what kind of good he
is pointing out which is “better than” a penalty; which
cannot seem good but by comparison with something very bad; so that the
reason why “marrying” is good, is that
“burning” is worse. “Good” is worthy of
the name if it continue to keep that name without comparison, I say not
with evil, but even with some second good; so that, even if it
is
compared to some other good, and is by some other cast into
the shade, it do nevertheless remain in possession of the name
“good.” If, however, it is the nature of an
evil
which is the means which compels the predicating
“good,” it is not so much “good” as a species
of inferior evil, which by being obscured by a superior evil is driven
to the name of good. Take away, in short, the condition of
comparison, so as not to say, “Better it is to marry than to
burn;” and I question whether you will have the hardihood to say,
“Better it is to marry,” not adding what that is which is
better. Therefore what is not
better
, of course is not
good
either; inasmuch as you have taken away and removed the
condition of comparison, which, while it makes the thing
“better,” so compels it to be regarded as
“good.” “Better it is to marry than to
burn” is to be understood in the same way as, “Better it is
to lack one eye than two:” if, however, you withdraw from
the comparison, it will not be “better” to have one eye,
inasmuch as it is not “good” either. Let none
therefore catch at a defence (of marriage) from this paragraph, which
properly refers to “the unmarried and widows,” for whom no
(matrimonial) conjunction is yet reckoned: although I hope I have
shown that even such must understand the nature of the
permission
.
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From
1 Cor. vii
.
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Or, “decreed
by.”
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1 Cor. vii. 8, 9
.