greatest good and evil proposed, reckoning both the degree of good and evil understood,
and the degree of Understanding, notice, and conviction of that proposed good and evil;
and that it is thus necessarily, and can be otherwise in no instance: because it is asserted,
that it implies a contradiction, to suppose it ever to be otherwise.
I am sensible, the Doctor’s aim in these assertions is against the Calvinists; to show, in
opposition to them, that there is no need of any physical operation of the Spirit of God on
the Will, to change and determine that to a good choice, but that God’s operation and assist-
ance is only moral, suggesting ideas to the Understanding; which he supposes to be enough,
if those ideas are attended to, infallibly to obtain the end. But whatever his design was,
nothing can more directly and fully prove, that every determination of the Will, in choosing
and refusing, is necessary; directly contrary to his own notion of the liberty of the Will. For
if the determination of the Will, evermore, in this manner, follows the light, conviction, and
view of the Understanding, concerning the greatest good and evil, and this be that alone
which moves the Will, and it be a contradiction to suppose otherwise; then it is necessarily
so, the Will necessarily follows this light or view of the Understanding, not only in some of
its acts, but in every act of choosing and refusing. So that the Will does not determine itself
in any one of its own acts; but every act of choice and refusal depends on, and is necessarily
connected with, some antecedent cause; which cause is not the Will itself, nor any act of its
own, nor any thing pertaining to that faculty, but something belonging to another faculty,
whose acts go before the Will, in all its acts, and govern and determine them.
Here, if it should be replied, that although it be true, that according to the Doctor, the
final determination of the Will always depends upon, and is infallibly connected with, the
Understanding’s conviction, and notice of the greatest good; yet the Acts of the Will are not
necessary; because that conviction of the Understanding is first dependent on a preceding
Act of the Will, in determining to take notice of the evidence exhibited; by which means
the mind obtains that degree of conviction, which is sufficient and effectual to determine
the consequent and ultimate choice of the Will; and that the Will, with regard to that pre-
ceding act, whereby it determines whether to attend or no, is not necessary; and that in this,
the liberty of the Will consists, that when God holds forth sufficient objective light, the Will
is at liberty whether to command the attention of the mind to it or not.
Nothing can be more weak and inconsiderate than such a reply as this. For that preceding
Act of the Will, in determining to attend and consider, still is an Act of the Will; if the Liberty
of the Will consists in it, as is supposed, as if it be an Act of the Will, it is an act of choice or
refusal. And therefore, if what the Doctor asserts be true, it is determined by some antecedent
light in the Understanding concerning the greatest apparent good or evil. For he asserts, it
is that light which alone doth move the Will to choose or refuse. And therefore the Will must
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SECTION IX. Of the Connexion of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates…