sence1072 (of the Father), and not that He has His substance without origin, what term will
they use to denote the Father’s being without origin, when they have set aside the term un-
generate to indicate His essence? For if we are not taught the distinguishing difference of
the Persons by the term ungenerate, but are to regard it as indicating His very nature as
flowing in a manner from the subject-matter, and disclosing what we seek in articulate syl-
lables, it must follow that God is not, or is not to be called, ungenerate, there being no word
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left to express such peculiar significance in regard to Him. For inasmuch as according to
them the term ungenerate does not mean without origin, but indicates the Divine nature,
their argument will be found to exclude it altogether, and the term ungenerate slips out of
their teaching in respect to God. For there being no other word or term to represent that
the Father is ungenerate, and that term signifying, according to their fallacious argument,
something else, and not that He was not generated, their whole argument falls and collapses
into Sabellianism. For by this reasoning we must hold the Father to be identical with the
Son, the distinction between generated and ungenerate having been got rid of from their
teaching, so that they are driven to one of two alternatives: either they must again adopt the
view of the term as denoting a difference in the attributes proper to either Person, and not
as denoting the nature, or, abiding by their conclusions as to the word, they must side with
Sabellius. For it is impossible that the difference of the persons should be without confusion,
unless there be a distinction between generated and ungenerate. Accordingly if the term
denotes difference, essence will in no way be denoted by the appellation. For the definitions
of difference and essence are by no means the same. But if they divert the meaning of the
word so as to signify nature, they must be drawn into the heresy of those who are called
1072 Essence, substance, οὐσία. Most of this controversy might have been avoided by agreeing to banish the
word οὐσία entirely from this sort of connection with the Deity. Even Celsus the Neo-platonist had said, “God
does not partake of substance” (οὐσίας). “Exactly,” Origen replies, “God is partaken of, viz., by those who have
His spirit, rather than partakes of anything Himself. Indeed, the subject of substance involves questions com-
plicated and difficult to decide; most especially on this point. Supposing, that is, an absolute Substance, motionless,
incorporeal, is God beyond this Substance in rank and power, granting a share of it to those to whom according
to His Word He chooses to communicate it? Or is He Himself this Substance, though described as invisible in
that passage about the Saviour (Coloss. i. 15) ‘Who is the image of the invisible God,’ where invisible means in-
corporeal? Another point is this: is the Only-Begotten and First-Born of all Creatures to be pronounced the
Substance of substances, the Original Idea of all ideas, while the Father God Himself is beyond all these?” (c.
Cels. vi. 64). (Such a question as this last, however, could not have been asked a century later, when Athanasius
had dispelled all traces of Neo-platonic subordination from the Christian Faith. Uncreated Spirit, not Invisible
First Substance, is the mark of all in the Triune-God. But the effort of Neo-platonism to rise above every term
that might seem to include the Deity had not been thrown away. Even “God is Spirit” is only a conception, not
a definition, of the Deity; while “God is substance” ought to be regarded as an actual contradiction in terms.)
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Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.