is ingenious, and in some respects quite satisfactory. But a brief representation of the same result in another
way, may demand some attention. 1. It is probably more philosophical, as well as more intelligible, in describing
the two kinds of principles, as the author calls them, possessed by Adam, to say, that the inferior ones were,
those faculties in man which constituted him a moral agent; rather than calling them “the principles of mere
human nature.” The superior ones are very accurately described; but instead of calling them “supernatural
principles;” they may more properly be termed, divine, benevolent, sovereign influence, superadded to those
faculties which constituted adam a moral agent. This representation leads to the essential relations that subsist
between God and his creature man. “Mere human nature,” and “supernatural principles” convey no distinctive
character of relation. “Faculties which constitute a moral agent,” express the ground of relation between equity
in God and accountableness in man; and “benevolent influences,” express the ground of relation between sov-
ereignty in God and passiveness in man. 2. That Adam had such qualifications, or faculties, as rendered him a
moral agent, independently of his spiritual knowledge, righteousness, holiness, dominion, honour, and glory—in
other words, his divine light, holy life, and supreme love to God—is self-evident. For, after he had lost those
excellencies, he was confessedly no less a moral agent, and accountable to his divine Governor and Judge for
his temper, thoughts, desires, words, and works, than he was before he lost them. 3. The philosophical cause,
or the true origin, of Adam’s defection, was his liberty in union with his passive power. For an explanation of
these terms, and the proof of the proposition just laid down, we must refer the reader to our notes on the first
volume of this work, where the subject is professedly discussed. 4. The true and ultimate cause of the first sin
of Adam, of all his subsequent sins, and those of his posterity, whether infants or adults, is not essentially different.
If the principles, as our author calls them, or the faculties and qualifications, which constitute moral agency and
accountability, be left to themselves—whereby they become influenced by passive power, not counteracted by
sovereign, benevolent, or holy divine influence—the effect will be the same, though attended with different cir-
cumstances. 5. When the cause of Adam’s integrity, perfection, spirituality, and happiness, or his paradisiacal
life, was no longer operative for his preservation, defection ensued; which consisted in the loss of the chief good,
together with that disorder, confusion, and a conscious exposedness to a continuance in that state, whereby
happiness was necessarily exchanged for a restless uneasiness, called misery. 6. This was the case of Adam in
his own person. But our author, in the next chapter, excellently shows, that Adam and all his posterity were
strictly one. This union we may call a systematic whole. For mankind, or the whole race of man, has a constituted
connexion, no less than a seed with its plant; for instance, the acorn with the oak-plant, and that with its future
branches. We justly called it the same tree from the time it was planted to its utmost longevity, though some of
its branches came into existence a hundred years or more after the first shoot. This union of Adam with his
posterity, is no less a constituted union, than that which connects the solar system; or any other inferior system-
atic whole, as an animal body, which is regarded as one from its birth till its death. For instance, nothing but a
constitution founded in the sovereign pleasure of God, caused the body of Methuselah to be the same, or regarded
as the same, when in infancy, and above nine hundred years after. The parts of his body, at least most of them,
were as different in old age, compared with his infancy, as any of his posterity are different from Adam. In each
case alike, the appointment of God in forming a course of nature, or his operations according to a constituted
plan, could make the body of Methuselah to be the same body from the first to the last; and the posterity of
Adam the same with himself. 7. In every vital system there is a vital part, and in every other system, as such, one
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CHAPTER II. God not the Author of Sin.