some previous reason to dispose the mind to action.” (So also p. 257.) And he speaks of these
things, as what we may be absolutely certain of, and which are the foundation, the only
foundation we have of certainty respecting God’s moral perfections. (p. 252 - 255, 261 -
264.)
And yet, at the same time, by his scheme, the influence of Motives upon us to excite to
action, and to be actually a ground of volition, is consequent on the volition or choice of the
mind. For he very greatly insists upon it, that in all free actions, before the mind is the subject
of those volitions, which Motives excite, it chooses to be so. It chooses, whether it will
comply with the Motive, which presents itself in view, or not; and when various Motives
are presented, it chooses which it will yield to, and which it will reject. (p. 256.) “Every man
has power to act, or to refrain from acting, agreeably with, or contrary to, any Motive that
presents.” (p. 257.) “Every man is at liberty to act, or refrain from acting, agreeably with, or
contrary to, what each of these Motives, considered singly, would excite him to.—Man has
power, and is as much at liberty, to reject the Motive that does prevail, as he has power, and
is at liberty, to reject those Motives that do not.” (And so p. 310, 311.) “In order to constitute
a moral agent, it is necessary, that he should have power to act, or to refrain from acting,
upon such moral Motives, as he pleases.” And to the like purpose in many other places.
According to these things, the Will acts first, and chooses or refuses to comply with the
Motive that is presented, before it falls under its prevailing influence: and it is first determined
by the mind’s pleasure or choice, what Motives it will be induced by, before it is induced by
them.
Now, how can these things hang together? How can the mind first act, and by its act of
volition and choice determine what Motives shall be the ground and reason of its volition
and choice? For this supposes, the choice is already made, before the Motive has its effect;
and that the volition is already exerted, before the Motive prevails, so as actually to be the
ground of the volition; and make the prevailing of the Motive, the consequence of the volition,
of which yet it is the ground. If the mind has already chosen to comply with a Motive, and
to yield to its excitement, the excitement comes in too late, and is needless afterwards. If the
mind has already chosen to yield to a Motive which invites to a thing, that implies, and in
fact is, a choosing of the thing invited to; and the very act of choice is before the influence
of the Motive which induces, and is the ground of the choice; the son is before-hand with
the father that begets him: the choice is supposed to be the ground of that influence of the
Motive, which very influence is supposed to be the ground of the choice. And so vice versa,
the choice is supposed to be the consequence of the influence of the Motive, which influence
of the Motive is the consequence of that very choice.
And besides, if the Will acts first towards the Motive before it falls under its influence,
and the prevailing of the Motive upon it to induce it to act and choose, be the fruit and
consequence of its act and choice, then how is the Motive “a previous ground and reason
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SECTION X. Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives;…