tion to their severity; and to escape them you must quit this life.” What life, I pray? This
life, he says, which is oppressed by such evils. Then it is happy in the midst of these very
evils on account of which you say we must quit it? Or do you call it happy because you are
at liberty to escape these evils by death? What, then, if by some secret judgment of God you
were held fast and not permitted to die, nor suffered to live without these evils? In that case,
at least, you would say that such a life was miserable. It is soon relinquished, no doubt but
this does not make it not miserable; for were it eternal, you yourself would pronounce it
miserable. Its brevity, therefore, does not clear it of misery; neither ought it to be called
happiness because it is a brief misery. Certainly there is a mighty force in these evils which
compel a man—according to them even a wise man—to cease to be a man that he may escape
them, though they say, and say truly, that it is as it were the first and strongest demand of
nature that a man cherish himself, and naturally therefore avoid death, and should so stand
his own friend as to wish and vehemently aim at continuing to exist as a living creature, and
subsisting in this union of soul and body. There is a mighty force in these evils to overcome
this natural instinct by which death is by every means and with all a man’s efforts avoided,
and to overcome it so completely that what was avoided is desired, sought after, and if it
cannot in any other way be obtained, is inflicted by the man on himself. There is a mighty
force in these evils which make fortitude a homicide,—if, indeed, that is to be called fortitude
which is so thoroughly overcome by these evils, that it not only cannot preserve by patience
the man whom it undertook to govern and defend, but is itself obliged to kill him. The wise
man, I admit, ought to bear death with patience, but when it is inflicted by another. If, then,
as these men maintain, he is obliged to inflict it on himself, certainly it must be owned that
the ills which compel him to this are not only evils, but intolerable evils. The life, then,
which is either subject to accidents, or environed with evils so considerable and grievous,
could never have been called happy, if the men who give it this name had condescended to
yield to the truth, and to be conquered by valid arguments, when they inquired after the
happy life, as they yield to unhappiness, and are overcome by overwhelming evils, when
they put themselves to death, and if they had not fancied that the supreme good was to be
found in this mortal life; for the very virtues of this life, which are certainly its best and most
useful possessions, are all the more telling proofs of its miseries in proportion as they are
helpful against the violence of its dangers, toils, and woes. For if these are true virtues,—and
such cannot exist save in those who have true piety,—they do not profess to be able to deliver
the men who possess them from all miseries; for true virtues tell no such lies, but they profess
that by the hope of the future world this life, which is miserably involved in the many and
great evils of this world, is happy as it is also safe. For if not yet safe, how could it be happy?
And therefore the Apostle Paul, speaking not of men without prudence, temperance, forti-
tude, and justice, but of those whose lives were regulated by true piety, and whose virtues
were therefore true, says, “For we are saved by hope: now hope which is seen is not hope;
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What the Christians Believe Regarding the Supreme Good and Evil, in Opposition…