unoccupied land, in an uninhabited country, makes it his own possession and property,
and as such rejoices in it. Where things were indifferent before, the Will finds nothing to
make them more agreeable, considered merely in themselves, but the pleasure it feels arising
from its own choice, and its perseverance therein. We love many things which we have
chosen, and purely because we chose them.”
This is as much as to say, that we first begin to prefer many things, purely because we
have preferred and chosen them before.—These things must needs be spoken inconsiderately
by this author. Choice or preference cannot be before itself in the same instance, either in
the order of time or nature: It cannot be the foundation of itself, or the consequence of itself.
The very act of choosing one thing rather than another, is preferring that thing, and that is
setting a higher value on that thing. But that the mind sets a higher value on one thing than
another, is not, in the first place, the fruit of its setting a higher value on that thing.
This author says, (p. 36.) “The Will may be perfectly indifferent, and yet the Will may
determine itself to choose one or the other.” And again, in the same page, “I am entirely
indifferent to either; and yet my Will may determine itself to choose.” And again, “Which
I shall choose must be determined by the mere act of my Will.” If the choice is determined
by a mere act of Will, then the choice is determined by a mere act of choice. And concerning
this matter, viz. That the act of the Will itself is determined by act of choice, this writer is
express. (p. 72.) Speaking of the case, where there is no superior fitness in objects presented,
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he has these words: “There it must act by its own choice., and determine itself as it pleases.”
Where it is supposed that the very determination, which is the ground and spring of the
Will’s act, is an act of choice and pleasure, wherein one act is more agreeable than another;
and this preference and superior pleasure is the ground of all it does in the case. And if so,
the mind is not indifferent when it determines itself, but had rather determine itself one
way than another. And therefore the Will does not act at all in indifference; not so much as
in the first step it takes. If it be possible for the understanding to act in indifference, yet
surely the Will never does; because the Will beginning to act is the very same thing as it
beginning to choose or prefer. And if in the very first act of the Will, the mind prefers
something, then the idea of that thing preferred, does at that time preponderate, or prevail
in the mind: or, which is the same thing, the idea of it has a prevailing influence on the Will.
So that this wholly destroys the thing supposed, viz. That the mind can by a sovereign power
choose one of two or more things, which in the view of the mind are, in every respect, per-
fectly equal, one of which does not at all preponderate, nor has any prevailing influence on
the mind above another.
So that this author, in his grand argument for the ability of the Will to choose one of
two or more things, concerning which it is perfectly indifferent, does at the same time, in
effect, deny the thing he supposes, even that the Will, in choosing, is subject to no prevailing
influence of the view of the thing chosen. And indeed it is impossible to offer this argument
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SECTION VI. Concerning the Will determining in things which are perfectly…