ining to bestow his favours on one person rather than another. We are to distinguish between
the merit of the object of God’s favour, or a moral qualification of the object attracting that
favour and recommending to it, and the natural fitness of such a determination of the act
of God’s goodness, to answer some wise design of his own, some end in the view of God’s
omniscience.—It is God’s own act, that is the proper and immediate object of his Volition.
3. I suppose that none will deny, but that, in some instances, God acts from wise design
in determining the particular subjects of his favours: none will say, I presume, that when
God distinguishes, by his bounty, particular societies or persons, he never, in any instance,
exercises any wisdom in so doing, aiming at some happy consequence. And, if it be not
denied to be so in some instances, then I would inquire, whether in these instances God’s
goodness is less manifested, than in those wherein God has no aim or end at all? And
whether the subjects have less cause of thankfulness? And if so, who shalt be thankful for
the bestowment of distinguishing mercy, with that enhancing circumstance of the distinction
being made without an end? How shall it be known when God is influenced by some wise
aim, and when not? It is very manifest, with respect to the apostle Paul, that God had wise
ends in choosing him to be a Christian and an apostle, who had been a persecutor, &c. The
apostle himself mentions one end. (1 Tim. i. 15, 16.) “Christ Jesus came into the world to
save sinners, of whom I am chief. Howbeit, for this cause I obtained mercy, that in me first,
Jesus Christ might show forth all long-suffering, for a pattern to them who should hereafter
believe on him to life everlasting.” But yet the apostle never looked on it as a diminution of
the freedom and riches or divine grace in his election, which he so often and so greatly
magnifies. This brings me to observe,
4. Our supposing such a moral Necessity in the acts of God’s Will, as has been spoken
of, is so far from necessarily derogating from the riches of God’s grace to such as are the
chosen objects of his favour, that, in many instances, this moral necessity may arise from
goodness, and from the great degree of it. God may choose this object rather than another,
as having a superior fitness to answer the ends, designs, and inclinations of his goodness;
being more sinful, and so more miserable and necessitous than others, the inclinations of
infinite mercy and benevolence may be more gratified, and the gracious design of God in
sending his Son into the world, may be more abundantly answered, in the exercises of mercy
towards such an object, rather than another.
One thing more I would observe, before I finish what I have to say on the head of the
Necessity of the acts of God’s Will; and that is, that something much more like a servile
subjection of the Divine Being to fatal Necessity, will follow from Arminian principles, than
from the doctrines which they oppose. For they (at least most of them) suppose, with respect
to all events that happen in the moral world, depending on the Volitions of moral agents,
which are the most important events of the universe, to which all others are subordinate; I
say, they suppose, with respect to these, that God has a certain foreknowledge of them,
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SECTION VIII. Some further objections against the moral Necessity of God's…