Testimonia

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ining to bestow his favours on one person rather than another. We are to distinguish between the merit of the object of God’s favour, or a moral qualification of the object attracting that favour and recommending to it, and the natural fitness of such a determination of the act of God’s goodness, to answer some wise design of his own, some end in the view of God’s omniscience.—It is God’s own act, that is the proper and immediate object of his Volition. 3. I suppose that none will deny, but that, in some instances, God acts from wise design in determining the particular subjects of his favours: none will say, I presume, that when God distinguishes, by his bounty, particular societies or persons, he never, in any instance, exercises any wisdom in so doing, aiming at some happy consequence. And, if it be not denied to be so in some instances, then I would inquire, whether in these instances God’s goodness is less manifested, than in those wherein God has no aim or end at all? And whether the subjects have less cause of thankfulness? And if so, who shalt be thankful for the bestowment of distinguishing mercy, with that enhancing circumstance of the distinction being made without an end? How shall it be known when God is influenced by some wise aim, and when not? It is very manifest, with respect to the apostle Paul, that God had wise ends in choosing him to be a Christian and an apostle, who had been a persecutor, &c. The apostle himself mentions one end. (1 Tim. i. 15, 16.) “Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, of whom I am chief. Howbeit, for this cause I obtained mercy, that in me first, Jesus Christ might show forth all long-suffering, for a pattern to them who should hereafter believe on him to life everlasting.” But yet the apostle never looked on it as a diminution of the freedom and riches or divine grace in his election, which he so often and so greatly magnifies. This brings me to observe, 4. Our supposing such a moral Necessity in the acts of God’s Will, as has been spoken of, is so far from necessarily derogating from the riches of God’s grace to such as are the chosen objects of his favour, that, in many instances, this moral necessity may arise from goodness, and from the great degree of it. God may choose this object rather than another, as having a superior fitness to answer the ends, designs, and inclinations of his goodness; being more sinful, and so more miserable and necessitous than others, the inclinations of infinite mercy and benevolence may be more gratified, and the gracious design of God in sending his Son into the world, may be more abundantly answered, in the exercises of mercy towards such an object, rather than another. One thing more I would observe, before I finish what I have to say on the head of the Necessity of the acts of God’s Will; and that is, that something much more like a servile subjection of the Divine Being to fatal Necessity, will follow from Arminian principles, than from the doctrines which they oppose. For they (at least most of them) suppose, with respect to all events that happen in the moral world, depending on the Volitions of moral agents, which are the most important events of the universe, to which all others are subordinate; I say, they suppose, with respect to these, that God has a certain foreknowledge of them, 724 SECTION VIII. Some further objections against the moral Necessity of God's…

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