302 INSTITUTES OF THE BOOK II.
it is naturally endued ; that, at the same time, the in
ferior movement, which is termed sense, and by which the
mind is led away to error and delusion, is of such a nature,
that it can be tamed and gradually subdued by the power of
reason. To the will, moreover, they give an intermediate
place between reason and sense, regarding it as possessed of
full power and freedom, whether to obey the former, or yield
itself up to be hurried away by the latter.
3. Sometimes, indeed, convinced by their own experience,
they do not deny how difficult it is for man to establish the
supremacy of reason in himself, in as much as he is at one time
enticed by the allurements of pleasure ; at another, deluded
by a false semblance of good ; and, at another, impelled
by unruly passions, and pulled away (to use Plato's ex
pression) as by ropes or sinews, (Plato, De Legibus, lib. i.)
For this reason, Cicero says, that the sparks given forth by
nature are immediately extinguished by false opinions and
depraved manners, (Cicero, Tusc. Qua3st. lib. iii.) They
confess that when once diseases of this description have
seized upon the mind, their course is too impetuous to be
easily checked, and they hesitate not to compare them to
fiery steeds, which, having thrown off the charioteer, scamper
away without restraint. At the same time, they set it
down as beyond dispute, that virtue and vice are in our
own power. For, (say they,) If it is in our choice to do this
thing or that, it must also be in our choice not to do it :
Again, If it is in our choice not to act, it must also be in our
choice to act : But both in doing and abstaining we seem
to act from free choice ; and, therefore, if we do good
when we please, we can also refrain from doing it ; if
we commit evil, we can also shun the commission of it,
(Aristot. Ethic, lib. iii. c. 5.) Nay, some have gone the
length of boasting, (Seneca, passim,) that it is the gift of the
gods that we live, but our own that we live well and purely.
Hence Cicero says, in the person of Cotta, that as every
one acquires virtue for himself, no wise man ever thanked
the gods for it. " We are praised," says he, "for virtue, and
glory in virtue, but this could not be, if virtue were the gift
of God, and not from ourselves," (Cicero, De Nat. Deorum.)