252 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK X.
have believed the soul to be made up of very minute and in-
dividual corpuscules, which they call atoms, meeting in them-
selves and cohering. Others have said that its substance is
air, others fire. Others have been of opinion that it is no
substance at all, since they could not think any substance
unless it is body, and they did not find that the soul was body;
but it was in their opinion the tempering together itself of
our body, or the combining together of the elements, by which
that flesh is as it were conjoined. And hence all of these have
held the soul to be mortal ; since, whether it were body, or
some combination of body, certainly it could not in either case
continue always without death. But they who have held
its substance to be some kind of life the reverse of corporeal,
since they have found it to be a life that animates and quickens
every living body, have by consequence striven also, according
as each was able, to prove it immortal, since life cannot be
without life. For as to that fifth kind of body, I know not
what, which some have added to the four well-known elements
of the world, and have said that the soul was made of this, I
do not think we need spend time in discussing it in this place.
For either they mean by body what we mean by it, viz. that
of which a part is less than the whole in extension of place,
and they are to be reckoned among those who have believed
the mind to be corporeal : or if they call either all substance, or
all changeable substance, body, whereas they know that not all
substance is contained in extension of place by any length
and breadth and height,we need not contend with them about
a question of words.
10. Now, in the case of all these opinions, any one who
sees that the nature of the mind is at once substance, and yet
not corporeal,—that is, that it does not occupy a less extension
of place with a less part of itself, and a greater with a greater,
—
must needs see at the same time that they who are of opinion
that it is corporeal, do not err from defect of knowledge con-
cerning mind, but because they associate with it qualities
without which they are not able to conceive any nature at
alL For if you bid them conceive of existence that is without
corporeal phantasms, they hold it merely nothing. And so
the mind would not seek itself, as though wanting to itself.