the mind. The faculty of Conception may and does play us false; it can create monstrosities.
Besides, if the names of the Father are conceptions, the names of the Son are too; for instance,
the Door, the Shepherd, the Axe, the Vine. But as our Lord Himself applied these to Himself,
He would, according to you, be employing the faculty of conception; and it is blasphemous
to think that He employed names which we too might have arrived at by conceiving of Him
in these particular ways. Therefore, Conception is not the Source of the Divine Names; but
rather they come from a perception or intention implanted in us directly from on High.
Ungenerate is such a name; and it reveals to us the very substance of the Deity.” But Gregory
defends Basil’s position. He shows the entire relativity of our knowledge of the Deity. Un-
generate and every other name of God is due to a conception; in each case we perceive either
an operation of the Deity, or an element of evil, and then we conceive of Him as operating
in the one, or as free from the other; and so name Him. But there is no conception, because
there is no perception, of the substance of the Deity. Scripture, which has revealed His op-
erations, has not revealed that. “The human mind…feels after the unutterable Being in
divers and many-sided ways; and never chases the mystery in the light of one idea alone.
Our grasping of Him would indeed be easy, if there lay before us one single assigned path
to the knowledge of God; but, as it is, from the skill apparent in the Universe, we get the
idea of skill in the Ruler of the Universe;…and again, when we see the execrable character
of evil, we grasp His own unalterable pureness as regards this,…not that we split up the
subject of such attributes along with them, but, believing that this Being, whatever it be in
substance, is one, we still conceive that it has something in common with all these ideas.”
To sum up, it had suited Eunomius to try to disparage ᾽Επίνοια so far as to make it appear
morally impossible that any name of God, but especially ᾽Αγέννητος, should be derived
from such a source. He scoffs at the orthodox party for treating the privative terms for the
Deity as merely privative, embodying only a “notion,” and for adhering to the truth that
God’s name is “above every name.” He “does not see how God can be above His works
simply by virtue of such things as do not belong to Him;” this is only “giving to words the
prerogative over realities.” He wants, and believes in the existence of, a word for the substance
of God, and he finds it in ᾽Αγέννητος, which according to him is not privative at all; it is the
single name for the single Deity, and all the others are bound up in it. “The universal
Guardian thought it right to engraft these names in our minds by a law of His creation.”
“These utterances are from above.” The importance of this word to the Anomœans is obvious.
Gregory, as spokesman of the Nicene party, defends the efficacy of the mental operation of
conception to supply terms for the Deity, which, however, can none of them be final. God
is incomprehensible. At the same time there is a spiritual insight of God (an ἔννοια in fact)
which far surpasses Eunomius’ intellectual certainty (see note p. 256).
476
Introduction.