And now let us see what he adds
to his previous statements. “Not dividing,” he says,
“His own essence by begetting, and being at once begetter and
begotten, at the same time Father and Son; for He is
incorruptible.” Of such a kind as this, perhaps, is that of which
the prophet says, touching the ungodly, “They weave a
spider’s web Is. lix. 5..” For as in the
cobweb there is the appearance of something woven, but no
substantiality in the appearance,—for he who touches it touches
nothing substantial, as the spider’s threads break with the touch
of a finger,—just such is the unsubstantial texture of idle
phrases. “Not dividing His own essence by begetting and being at
once begetter and begotten.” Ought we to give his words the name
of argument, or to call them rather a swelling of humours secreted by
some dropsical inflation? For what is the sense of “dividing His
own essence by begetting, and being at once begetter and
begotten?” Who is so distracted, who is so demented, as to make
the statement against which Eunomius thinks he is doing battle? For the
Church believes that the true Father is truly Father of His own Son, as
the Apostle says, not of a Son alien from Him. For thus he declares in
one of his Epistles, “Who spared not His own Son Rom. viii. 32.,” distinguishing Him, by the addition
of “own,” from those who are counted worthy of the adoption
of sons by grace and not by nature. But what says He who disparages
this belief of ours? “Not dividing His own essence by begetting,
or being at once begetter and begotten, at the same time Father and
Son; for He is incorruptible.” Does one who hears in the Gospel
that the Word was in the beginning, and was God, and that the Word came
forth from the Father, so befoul the undefiled doctrine with these base
and fetid ideas, saying “He does not divide His essence by
begetting?” Shame on the abomination of these base and filthy
notions! How is it that he who speaks thus fails to understand that God
when manifested in flesh did not admit for the formation of His own
body the conditions of human nature, but was born for us a Child by the
Holy Ghost and the power of the Highest; nor was the Virgin subject to
those conditions, nor was the Spirit diminished, nor the power of the
Highest divided? For the Spirit is entire, the power of the Highest
remained undiminished: the Child was born in the fulness of our
nature This,
or something like this, appears to be the force of ὅλον., and did not sully the incorruption of His
mother. Then was flesh born of flesh without carnal passion: yet
Eunomius will not admit that the brightness of the glory is from the
glory itself, since the glory is neither diminished nor divided by
begetting the light. Again, the word of man is generated from his mind
without division, but God the Word cannot be generated from the Father
without the essence of the Father being divided! Is any one so witless
as not to perceive the irrational character of his position? “Not
dividing,” quoth he, “His own essence by begetting.”
Why, whose own essence is divided by begetting? For in the case of men
essence means human nature: in the case of brutes, it means,
generically, brute nature, but in the case of cattle, sheep, and all
brute animals, specifically, it is regarded according to the
distinctions of their kinds. Which, then, of these divides its own
essence by the process of generation? Does not the nature always remain
undiminished in the case of every animal by the succession of its
posterity? Further a man in begetting a man from himself does not
divide his nature, but it remains in its fulness alike in him who
begets and in him who is begotten, not split off and transferred from
the one to the other, nor mutilated in the one when it is fully formed
in the other, but at once existing in its entirety in the former and
discoverable in its entirety in the latter. For both before begetting
his child the man was a rational animal, mortal, capable of
intelligence and knowledge, and also after begetting a man endowed with
such qualities: so that in him are shown all the special properties of
his nature; as he does not lose his existence as a man by begetting the
man derived from him, but remains after that event what he was before
without causing any diminution of the nature derived from him by the
fact that the man derived from him comes into being.